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Criminal responsibility is individual. Even when persons are 
alleged to have committed a crime together, individuals - not 
groups - are arrested, charged, convicted, and sentenced. We 
have departed from this principle only rarely. Vicarious criminal 
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liability is infrequent, ordinarily subject to only minor punish-
ment, and clearly regulatory .1 Under the law of parties, one can 
be held responsible for another's offense, but only upon a showing 
of purposeful assistance in the crime.2 Even under expansive 
views of the responsibility of criminal conspirators, vicarious lia-
bility requires that an individual join a group and that another 
member of the group commit a crime in furtherance of the con-
spiracy's objectives. 3 
While the substantive criminal law scrupulously honors the 
principle of individual responsibility, that principle is jeopar-
dized in a joint trial of two or more defendants. Statutes or deci-
sions in virtually all American jurisdictions permit joinder of de-
fendants charged with the same offense, with different offenses 
committed in furtherance of a common conspiracy, or with differ-
ent offenses arising out of the same transaction, episode, or series 
of transactions or episodes. 4 Rule 8(b) of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure typifies American joinder provisions: 
Two or more defendants may be charged in the same indict-
ment or information if they are alleged to have participated in the 
same act or transaction or in the same series of acts or transactions 
constituting an offense or offenses. Such defendants may be 
charged in one or more counts together or separately and all of the 
defendants need not be charged in each count. 5 
The prosecutor usually joins defendants by charging more than 
one actor in the same indictment, information, or complaint. 
Even when the prosecutor names the defendants in separate 
charging instruments, the trial judge may ordinarily consolidate 
the cases if the defendants could have been named in the same 
charging instrument. 6 
After joinder, separation is possible;7 for example, Rule 14 of 
1. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScO'l'l', HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 223-28 (1972) [hereinafter 
cited as LAFAVE]. 
2. See ·id. at 502-12. 
3. See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946). This expansive view has been 
criticized. See LAFAVE, supra note 1, at 513-15. 
4. The statutes and rules of court concerning joinder, consolidation, and severance 
are collected in ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRU,!INAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS 
RELATING TO JoINDER AND SEVERANCE app. A (Approved Draft, 1968). 
5. FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(b). 
6. See note 4 supra. FED. R. CRIM. P. 13 provides: 
The court may order two or more indictments or informations or both to be tried 
together if the offenses, and the defendants if there is more than one, could have 
been joined in a single indictment or information. This procedure shall be the same 
as if the prosecution were under such single indictment or information. 
7. See note 4 supra. 
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the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides in part: 
If it appears that a defendant or the government is prejudiced 
by a joinder . . . of defendants in an indictment or information or 
by such joinder for trial together, the court may . . . grant a sever-
ance of defendants or provide whatever other relief justice re-
quires. 8 
In practice, however, trial courts order separate trials only upon 
a showing of substantial prejudice to the defendant, and appel-
late courts reverse a denial of severance only for abuse of discre-
tion. The law has, in effect, created a strong presumption that 
defendants joined together should be tried together. 9 
This Article questions that presumption. Legislatures and 
courts, in weighing the relative advantages of joint and separate 
trials, have unreasonably struck a balance in favor of joint trials. 
The strongest justification traditionally offered for joint trials is 
efficiency. This Article shows that courts have greatly exagger-
ated the supposed efficiencies of joint trials while grossly underes-
timating the impediments joint trials pose to fair and accurate 
determinations of individual guilt or innocence. The propriety of 
joint trials is more than a question of efficiencies. Joint trials 
usually, although not always, help the prosecutor to get convic-
tions, and thereby modify the balance of advantage in criminal 
trials. 10 Disputes over joinder and severance should go beyond 
issues of procedural efficiency to consider the wisdom of such a 
modification. In considering questions of severance courts must 
value the impediments to fairness imposed by joint trials, both 
the general dangers inherent in complex litigation and the unique 
prejudices that flow from joinder. They must weigh these impedi-
ments, case by case, against a realistic assessment of the benefits 
of joinder. Such a balancing should replace the present blind 
preference for joint trials and the correlative barriers to sever-
ance. 
l. THE EFFICIENCIES AND OTHER BENEFITS OF JOINT TRIALS 
Courts and legislatures have rarely questioned their prefer-
ence for joint trials whenever several defendants are charged with 
related crimes. Frequently, courts simply assume the defendants 
charged together should be tried together in the absence of a 
8. FED. R. CRIM. P. 14. 
9. See, e.g., 1 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL 441-47 (1969). 
10. Appellate courts acknowledge this by asserting that a better opportunity for an 
acquittai in a separate triafis not a ground.for severance. "Id. at 443-44. 
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compelling reason for severance.11 Courts that bother to give rea-
sons usually point to the efficiencies of joint trials, occasionally 
suggesting other justifications to buttress their reliance on effi-
ciency.12 But a careful analysis of the alleged advantages of joint 
trials reveals that they are nonexistent or, at the least, grossly 
exaggerated.13 
A. The Efficiency Justification 
1. The Supposed Efficiencies 
Justice White, dissenting in Bruton v. United States, 14 in-
voked the conventional wisdom that "[u]nquestionably, joint 
trials are more economical and minimize the burden on wit-
nesses, prosecutors, and courts. They also avoid delays in bring-
11. See, e.g., Parker v. United States, 404 F.2d 1193 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 
U.S. 1004 (1969), upholding the district court's decision refusing to grant severance: 
Joint trials of persons charged together with committing the same offense or 
with being accessory to its commission are the rule, rather· than the exception. 
There is a substantial public interest in this procedure. It expedites the administra-
tion of justice, reduces the congestion of trial dockets, conserves judicial time, 
lessens the burden upon citizens who must sacrifice both time and money to serve 
upon juries, and avoids the necessity of recalling witnesses who would otherwise be 
called upon to testify only once. 
404 F.2d at 1196. See also Linn v. State, 505 P.2d 1270 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 983 
(1973). 
12. See text at notes 43-70 infra. If joint trials were always more efficient than sepa-
rate ones and if joint trials provided other substantial benefits, then severance would be 
rare. Severance would also be rare if one viewed the asserted prejudices to joined defen-
dants as imaginary or justly deserved. Concerning the last point, consider the court's 
remarks in Parker v. United States, 404 F.2d 1193 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 
1004 (1969). In response to defendant's contention that he was prejudiced because his 
codefendants testified while he did not and their counsel commented upon the fact that 
the testifying defendants "hid nothing" from the jury, the Ninth Circuit said, "When men 
get together to rob a bank, and do so, they take chances, one of which is that if they are 
caught there may no longer be honor among thieves." 404 F.2d at 1197. 
13. Of course, joinder of defendants deals with only a small segment of the criminal 
justice process - the trial. There is no reason why defendants charged together or whose 
cases are consolidated cannot jointly defend in a preliminary hearing where the issue is 
whether there is probable cause to believe each guilty. See FED. R. CruM. P. 5.1. There is 
also no reason why pretrial hearings dealing with motions for discovery, motions to sup-
press evidence, and challenges to the sufficiency of the charging instrument cannot be 
conducted jointly. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 12. Indeed, the Federal Rules contemplate joint 
pretrial hearings. Rule 12(b) provides in part that "[t]he following must be raised prior 
to trial: •.• (5) Requests for a severance of ... defendants under Rule 14." 
14. 391 U.S. 123 (1968). In Bruton the Court overruled Delli Paoli v. United States, 
352 U.S. 232 (1957), and held that admitting into evidence a codefendant's confession that 
implicated the defendant violated the defendant's rights of confrontation under the sixth 
amendment. Bruton's implications for separate trials are examined later. See text at notes 
127-75 infra. 
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ing those accused of crime to trial."15 While joint trials may be 
more efficient than individual trials in some cases, Justice 
White's assumptions raise several questions: How much more 
efficient?16 In what kinds of cases? How much additional burden 
would individual trials place upon witnesses? Should it make a 
difference who the witnesses are? How much delay would result 
from individual trials or would there be delay at all in many 
cases? The answers to these questions suggest several reasons for 
doubting whether a joint trial is more efficient in the typical case 
than separate trials. 
One supposed efficiency of joinder is a saving of the prosecu-
tor's time because of the substantial overlap of evidence against 
the different defendants. But whether the trial is joint or individ-
ual affects only a small portion of the prosecutor's investment of 
time. It does not affect police investigation, which is usually com-
pleted before the prosecutor decides on charging and joinder. 17 It 
should not affect plea bargaining - it is no more efficient for the 
prosecutor to plea bargain in a joined case than in one that has 
been severed. Although the threat of a joint trial may tilt the 
balance of advantage in plea bargaining toward the prosecutor, 
it may make actual agreement less likely.18 It need not affect 
pretrial hearings, which may be held jointly, even when the trials 
are separate. 18 It probably does not even make a substantial dif-
ference in the time the prosecutor spends preparing for trial. 
Whether trials are joint or separate, the prosecutor must review 
the evidentiary file and interview the witnesses. If separate trials 
15. 391 U.S. at 143. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority in Bruton, also assumed° 
that joint trials promote efficiency: "Joint trials do conserve state funds, diminish incon-
venience to witnesses and public authorities, and avoid delays in bringing those accused 
of crime to trial." 391 U.S. at 134. 
16. Some courts seem to assume that the savings follow a mathematical formula: a 
joint trial of two defendants is twice as efficient as separate trials, a joint trial of three 
defendants is three times as efficient, etc. See note 151 infra. 
17. W. LAFAVE, AlmEsT 305 (1965) ("In most cases the investigation is concluded by 
the time the prosecutor's office becomes involved.") 
18. Some prosecutors take an "all-or-none" position in plea bargaining with joined 
defendants and insist that each defendant accept the plea offer and plead guilty or none 
may do so. See, e.g., Seaton v. State, 472 S.W.2d 905 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971). The 
requirement of persuading each defendant to agree to a disposition of his case before the 
date set for the joint trial may mean that the case will be tried before a jury rather than 
disposed of by guilty pleas. If only one defendant resists the temptation to plea bargain, 
the others cannot plea bargain either. If the cases were severed and the others pied guilty, 
the resisting defendant, facing trial alone, might at the eleventh hour eagerly accept the 
government's offer. This is particularly likely if one or more of the plea agreements in-
cludes a promise to testify against any defendant holding out for a jury trial. 
19. See note 13 supra. 
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are held, the prosecutor must review the file again, but would 
surely not need as much time as he would to prepare a new case. 
A second presumed efficiency of joint trials is that they are 
more convenient for witnesses. In fact, however, the effect of joint 
trials on witnesses varies greatly from case to case and depends 
in part on whether the witness is a civilian or a professional. To 
involve lay witnesses in the prosecution of a case certainly forces 
real burdens upon them. They must leave work or home to testify, 
and an important witness may be required to remain at the court-
house throughout the trial. 20 If the witness is a child or the victim 
of an alleged sex offense, we do not want him to repeat the trauma 
of testifying without excellent reasons.21 Most witnesses in crimi-
nal trials, however, are not civilians but professionals. The bur-
den of presenting witnesses lies upon the government, whose wit-
nesses are usually police officers, laboratory employees, prosecu-
20. Parker v. United States, 404 F.2d 1193 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1004 
(1969): 
The witness is the forgotten man in the administration of justice. His knowl-
edge of the case may be purely fortuitous. Yet he can be compelled to attend, 
subject to heavy penalties for his failure to do so. The remuneration for loss of his 
time and for the inconvenience that he suffers is a mere pittance .•.• When he 
gets to court, he may wait a long time before he is called. In a criminal case he will 
probably be excluded from the courtroom and have to spend his time in a witness 
room, which may or may not even have windows, or, worse yet, in the corridor of 
the courthouse. He dare not talk to strangers or other witnesses; yet he is subject 
to being interviewed and re-interviewed by counsel for both sides. When called, he 
finds himself in a strange and often terrifying environment. . • . When he finishes, 
he may or may not be excused, depending upon whether some counsel thinks that 
he might want to recall him. Add to this merciless treatment. given by the news 
media to all participants, including witnesses, in a trial of any notoriety, and the 
attempts of-influence or the threats against his personal safety and that of his loved 
ones to which a witness is sometimes subjected, and it is no wonder that most 
citizens will do everything possible to avoid being called to testify. In a particular 
case, once ought to be enough. 
404 F.2d at 1196 n.4. 
21. In State v. Druke, 115 Ariz. 224, 564 P.2d 913 (Ct. App. 1977), the state sought 
mandamus to compel the trial judge to vacate his order severing the cases of two defen-
dants charged with kidnapping and rape. The appellate court ordered the relief sought, 
commenting, "We are of the opinion that the factors of judicial economy and the inconve-
nience to witnesses, particularly the victim, if separate trials are required, outweigh the 
'potential for prejudice' urged by [the defendant]." 115 Ariz. at 227, 564 P.2d at 916, 
One should distinguish the inconvenience of requiring a civilian witness to testify in 
more than one trial arising from the same episode and the stress from requiring a witness 
to testify about an embarrassing, humiliating, or degrading occurrence in more than one 
trial. The public interest in not requiring the witness to undergo the trauma of testifying 
more often than necessary far exceeds mere considerations of convenience, however impor-
tant those may seem to the witness himself. Further, special consideration should be given 
to the elderly or infirm witness because of the strain of testifying. See note 318 infra for a 
discussion of decisions 'that attempt to make such distinctions. 
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tion investigators, and others whose jobs include testifying in 
court. While· time away from the patrol beat or the laboratory is 
time away from important work, professional witnesses suffer lit-
tle personal inconvenience or expense by testifying more than 
once. Thus, when assessing the inconvenience that separate trials 
impose on witnesses, we should ask whether testifying is part of 
their jobs. 
Furthermore, the parties can protect witnesses from multiple 
appearances by stipulating necessary but undisputed noncritical 
testimony. For example, the testimony of the owner of burglar-
ized premises could be stipulated if there were no dispute that the 
burglary took place. Stipulation should also eliminate repeated 
testimony about laboratory results. Under appropriate circum-
stances, the trial court could even condition severance on stipula-
tions of such testimony. 
A third justification alleged for joint trials is that they con-
serve limited judicial resources. This efficiency is particularly 
stressed when joinder reduces the number of jury trials because, 
although jury trials are relatively infrequent in criminal cases, 
they consume a substantial part of a judge's court time. 22 But 
joint trials do not necessarily save judicial energy. They are far 
more difficult to schedule than individual trials: as the number 
of participants increases, it becomes harder to find a trial date 
acceptable to court, prosecution, witnesses, and defense attor-
neys. Consequently, the court is likely to schedule a joint trial 
later than an individual case.23 Moreover, a joint trial is less likely 
22. While the vast majority of criminal charges are disposed of without jury tria~ -
in dismissals, in guilty pleas, or in trials before the court - trial judges are understand-
ably concerned about any increase in the number of jury trials that must be conducted. 
In the year ending June 30, 1977, United States district courts disposed of 44,111 criminal 
cases. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED 
STATES COURTS 115 (1977). Of these, 4561 (10%) were disposed of by jury trial, 2661 (6%) 
by trials before the court, and the remainder (84%) by pleas of guilty and dismissals. Id. 
at 275. A jury trial is a cumbersome proceeding. Even under the stem hand of a judge 
determined to push ahead, it takes much longer to. dispose of a case by a jury trial than 
by any other means, including a trial before the court. Of the 2661 jury-waived criminal 
cases before United States district courts in the same year, 2149 (81%) were disposed of 
in one day or less, while only 885 of the 4561 jury trials (19%) were disposed of in one day 
or less. Id. at 352. Thus, although a judge may dispose of only 5 to 10% of his docket by 
jury trial, it takes only a small number of additional jury trials to destroy his calendar. 
For some judges, an addition of two or three criminal jury trials per year would represent 
a 25% increase in criminal jury trials. During the year ending June 30, 1977, there were 
398 authorized United States district court judgeships, Id. at 112. Since there were 4561 
criminal cases disposed of by jury trial during that year, that means there were 11.5 
criminal jury trials per judge, or about one a month. 
23. Congressional recognition that joinder of defendants is likely to d~lay the begin-
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to begin on schedule. If another case detains one of the defense 
attorneys longer than expected, the court must sever that attor., 
ney's client, place the entire case on hold until the other trial is 
over, or select a new trial date acceptable to all participants.2~ 
Depending upon the arrangements for backup trials, the second 
and third choices may consume substantial court time. 
In addition, once begun, joint trials are more complicated to 
conduct and take longer to complete than individual trials. In 
some jurisdictions the trial court must determine how multiple 
defendants may challenge potential jurors, a decision unneces-
sary to an individual trial.25 The trial judge must also work out 
the order in which the defense participates, since defense attor-
neys are likely to have different ideas about who should cross-
examine first, 26 present defenses. first, and argue to the jury last, 
ning of trial of a criminal case appears in § 101 of the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 3161-3174 (1976). The Act provides that trial must begin within specified time limits 
but provides that delay for certain pretrial proceedings "shall be excluded in computing 
the time ... within which the trial of any such offense must commence •.•• " 18 U,S.C. 
§ 3161(h) (1976). The following periods of delay, among others, are excluded: examination 
and hearing for determination of competency to stand trial, time during which a defen-
dant is actually incompetent to stand trial, time resulting from interlocutory appeals, 
delay resulting from the granting of the government's or a defendant's motion for continu-
ance. 18 U.S.C. § 316l(h) (1976). If the case of one defendant is properly delayed under 
the Act so that the time limits have not run as to him, then the Act further provides for 
exclusion of "a reasonable period of delay when the defendant is joined for trial with a 
codefendant as to whom the time for trial has not run and no motion for severance has 
been granted." 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) (1976). Finally, the trial court is cautioned against 
liberally granting motions for continuance but is instructed to consider as a factor in 
deciding upon such a motion "[w]hether the case taken as a whole is so unusual and so 
complex, due to the number of defendants or the nature of the prosecution or otherwise, 
that it is unreasonable to expect adequate preparation within the periods of time estab-
lished by this section." 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(B)(ii) (1976). 
24. Of course, when more witnesses are involved it is more likely that at least one 
will become unavailable. This is especially true of expert witnesses who may be testifying 
in other litigation or may have other professional commitments. Frequently, rescheduling 
the order in which witnesses testify will compensate for temporarily unavailable witnesses, 
25. For example, FED. R. CRIM. P. 24 provides that each side has 20 peremptory 
challenges in a capital case, 6 in noncapital felony cases, and 3 in other cases, However, 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b) provides, "If there is more than one defendant, the court may allow 
the defendants additional peremptory challenges and permit them to be exercised sepa-
rately or jointly." In Martin v. State, 262 Ind. 232, 317 N.E.2d 430 (1974), cert, denied, 
420 U.S. 911 (1975), the Indiana Supreme Court upheld a statute requiring coaefendants 
to join in exercising peremptory challenges against an attack based upon equal protection 
of the laws. 
26. A. AMsTERDAM, B. SEGAL & M. MILLER, TRIAL MANUAL FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIMI• 
NAL CASES 1-275 (3d ed. 1974), suggests that joined defendants wondering whether to seek 
severance should consider whether, under local practice, "counsel's cross-examination of 
prosecution witnesses [will] be cut off as 'cumulative' of that of counsel for a codefen-
dant." 
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whether there should be opening statements to the jury, and 
when they should be made.27 The judge may even have to arrange 
seating.28 During trial, a judge must expect many more objections 
from defense attorneys in a joint trial. In part, this is because 
more lawyers are available to object, each with a different interest 
to protect. But more important, as the number of defense attor-
neys increases, it is less likely that all will decide for tactical 
reasons not to object when an opportunity is presented. Further-
more, each attorney must object to evidence that damages his 
client, even if that evidence is admissible against a codefendant, 
particularly if the attorney is attempting a build an appellate 
record of prejudice from joinder. While the court may rule on 
many objections as they are made, many others will require ex-
tensive arguments or lengthy testimony outside the presence of 
the jury.29 
A fourth presumed justification for joint trials is that they 
reduce the cost of appeals. For example, if a joint trial ends with 
two or more convictions that are appealed, only one trial tran-
27. ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS REI.ATING'I'O Drs-
COVERY AND PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL § 5.4 (Approved Draft, 1970), recommends the trial 
court conduct a pretrial conference when it anticipates the trial will be unusually compli-
cated. The Standard recognizes as appropriate for resolution in a pretrial conference the 
following matters relating to multiplicity of defendants: 
(iv) excision from admissible statements of material prejudiciai to a codefendant; 
(v) severance of defendants or offenses; 
(vi) seating arrangements for defendants and counsel; •.. 
(viii)' conduct of voir dire; 
(ix) number and use of peremptory challenges; 
(x) procedure on objections where there are multiple counsel; 
(xi) order of presentation of evidence and arguments where there are multiple 
defendants; 
(xii) order of cross-examination where there are multip!e counsel; 
28. See, e.g., Kaufman, The Apalachin Trial: Further Observations on the Pre-Trial 
in Criminal Cases, 44 J. AM.. Juo. Socv. 53, 56 (1960): "Since the physical arrangement 
of the courtroom in a multi-defendant case is important, the attorneys were permitted to 
set up their own seating, subject again to the approval of the Court." 
29. A. AMSTERDAM, B. SEGAL & M. MILLER, supra note 26, at 1-356: 
When questions of fact are involved in determining the applicability of a rule 
governing the admission of evidence, the trial judge ordinarily decides those ques-
tions as trier of fact, even at a jury trial. When such preliminary factual questions 
are presented on defense objection to any item of prosecutive evidence worth object-
ing to in the first place, it is ordinarily important for-defense counsel to ask that 
the jury be excused during the presentation of testimony . . . on the preliminary 
question. 
Of course, some of the time consumed litigating the admissibility of evidence outside the 
presence of the jury can be reduced by pretrial hearings on motions to suppress and by 
pretrial argumettts on motions in limine. Even so, in a case even moderately complex, the 
time consumed with the jury out of the courtroom is likely to be substantial. 
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script is needed,30 since some of the issues are likely to be common 
to each appeal. The savings in court reporter and stenographic 
time may be small or substantial, depending upon the number of 
appellants and the issues they raise. But joinder may prove more 
expensive if only a minor participant appeals on the ground that 
the trial was unfair to him because he was such a minor figure. 31 
To demonstrate that prejudice, he may have to present the entire 
trial transcript to show that only a small portion involved him. 
On balance, several unpredictable variables determine whether a 
joint trial reduces the time and expense of an appeal. If the de-
fense attorneys present a unified attack upon the convictions, the 
savings for all parties during the briefing and oral argument may 
be substantial. But those savings are lost for points of error 
unique to each appellant. Moreover, each appellant may raise 
individual reasons why his joinder with the others particularly 
prejudiced him - appellate issues that would not have existed 
had the trials been separate.32 
Some might suggest that joint trials can offer economies for 
the defense. In some cases, two or more defendants may employ 
or be assigned the same counsel to defend them, although the 
increasing sensitivity of appellate courts to the potential conflict 
of interests in multiple-defendant representation makes this less 
likely today than before. 33 In theory, even if each defendant had 
separate counsel, the lawyers could improve the defense of each 
by coordinating their time, knowledge, and skills. Since each trial 
lawyer has his own strengths and weaknesses, they could mount 
a much stronger defense through a division of labor.34 
30. The appellate court may order the appeals consolidated so they may be presented 
upon a single record. See FED. R. APP. P. 3(b). 
31. See text at notes 97-101 infra. 
32. A similar observation was made by Justice Marshall, dissenting in Nelson v. 
O'Neill, 402 U.S. 622, 635 (1971): 
Those that argue for the use of joint trials contend that joint trials, although often 
resulting in prejudice to recognized rights of one or more of the codefendants, are 
justified because of the saving of time, money, and energy that result. But, as this 
case shows, much of the supposed saving is lost through protracted litigation that 
results from the impingement or near impingement of a codefendant's right of 
confrontation and equal protection. 
33. See, e.g., Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978); State v. Olsen, 258 N.W.2d 
898 (Minn. 1977). For an excellent discussion of the entire topic of multiple representation 
of criminal defendants, see Geer, Representation of Multiple Criminal Defendants: Con-
flicts of Interest and the Professional Responsibilities of the Defense Attorney, 62 MtNN, 
L. R.Ev. 119 (1978). 
34. One author has suggested that in multi-defense-counsel cases one attorney be 
designated "senior" or "coordinating" counsel, to act as "advisory attorney with respect 
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But there are flaws in this idyllic scene. If the quality of the 
attorneys varies, the poor lawyer may hinder the skillful one.35 
Even among competent attorneys cooperation will be less than 
perfect because each defense attorney must be acutely aware of 
his responsibility to his own client. They will cooperate only if 
cooperation furthers each client's interests. Furthermore, each 
must be aware that at any time before the end of the trial one 
defendant may strike a deal with the prosecutor, testify against 
the others, and reveal the ~ntire deferise strategy to the govern-
ment. Alert attorneys also remember that sometimes government 
informants are "prosecuted" jointly with real defendants, in part 
to preserve their covers. 38 Even when defense attorneys want to 
cooperate, each must remain somewhat uneasy about what the 
others will do. That uneasiness negates many of the benefits join-
der may bestow on the defense. 
2. The Underlying Assumption 
Underlying these supposed efficiencies is an assumption that 
if defendants are not joined, each will undergo a separate jury 
trial. There are, however, good reasons to question that assump-
tion. When cases are severed,. the first trial may well be the only 
trial: its results will often prompt the litigants to dispose of the 
remaining cases without trial, or at least without jury trial. The 
first trial will answer a number of questions for the litigants. Will 
a jury find the prosecution's theory of liability persuasive? Will 
civilian witnesses cooperate? Will a jury believe the witnesses? 
Will the court admit critical pieces of evidence? 
To the extent a case goes to trial because of uncertainty 
about strength of proof, credibility of witnesses, and acceptability 
of different theories to a jury, answering some or all of these 
questions will quickly lead to settlement of remaining cases. After 
the first trial, each party can evaluate its chances much more 
accurately and may settle the case without trial or may, if the 
only substantial issues remaining are legal, waive a jury trial. 
to those areas in which the interests of all defendants are the same." Wessel, Procedural 
Safeguards for the Mass Conspiracy Trial, 48 A.B.A.J. 628 (1962). · 
35. "Referral of potential co-defendants to other counsel stems not only from the 
desire to control litigation, but also from the need to assure competent co-counsel, both 
before and at trial, since error by one counsel often influences the outcome of the whole 
case." Margolin, Representing Multiple Defendants in Criminal Cases, in PRACTICING LAW 
INSTITUTE, 15TH ANNUAL: DEFENDING CRIMINAL CASES 497 (1977) . 
. 36. See, e.g., Weatherford v. Bursey, 42~ U.S. 545 (1977). 
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Therefore, the prosecutor will often seek to try the most serious 
and strongest case first, hoping the results will encourage the 
other defendants to accept more reasonable terms. In addition, 
one or more of the defendants may aid his own cause by offering 
to testify for the prosecution against his codefendants. 37 When 
that is acceptable to the prosecution, it not only eliminates the 
trial of the defendant who testifies for the government, but also 
tends to promote rapid settlement of the other cases. 38 
The prosecutor may have personal reasons to dislike sequen-
tial jury trials. Trying a second codefendant is like viewing the 
rerun of a movie: it lacks the uncertainty that makes a criminal 
trial exciting for an active prosecutor. For that reason, he, too, 
may be more willing to settle the second case than the first. For 
the same reason, the news media are likely to give a second trial 
less extensive coverage and so a prosecutor motivated by media 
exposure will not have that incentive the second time around. 
Finally, empirical data do not support the conventional wis-
dom that severing cases burdens the criminal justice system with 
sequential jury trials. One study suggests that when defendants 
have a right of severance, sequential trials are rare. In 1973, Ver-
mont provided a right of severance in all felony cases punishable 
by· more than five years' imprisonment.39 A 1973 survey of Ver-
mont trial judges and prosecutors found that "joint trials are 
virtually unheard of, "40 even in cases, such as misdemeanors, not 
within the statutory right of severance. The survey also shows 
that when severance is granted, the first trial is the only trial, a 
phenomenon the author terms the "domino theory": 
The verdict of the first defendant tried has a great deal of bearing 
on the disposition of the other defendants charged with the same 
offense. . . . In a vast majority of the cases, an initial conviction 
has induced the awaiting codefendants to negotiate a plea. . . . 
Thus, the experience has been that a single trial of one defendant 
37. A. AMSTERDAM, B. SEGAL & M. MILLER, supra note 26, at 1-92: "The police or the 
prosecution will sometimes offer a client the opportunity to 'cooperate' by testifying 
against accomplices in exchange for dismissal or reduction of charges, or for recommenda-
tion of leniency to the trial judge." 
38. Id. at 1-102: "A codefendant may turn state's evidence at any time; and his 
testimony is likely to be decisive at trial." Once the prosecutor has arranged for the 
testimony of a codefendant, he is likely to tell the defendant that he has done so in hope 
of inducing him to plead guilty and avoiding the ordeal of trial. 
39. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 6507 (1958) (repealed 1973). This right did not extend 
to conspiracy cases. Vermont has since expanded the right of severance. See note 315 infra. 
40. Langrock, Joint Trials: A Short Lesson From Little Vermont, 9 CRIM, L. BULL. 
612, 616 (1973). 
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has resulted in the disposition of almost all the charges stemming 
out of the single crime, and this has occurred without the length 
of the joint trial and the attendant complications that almost al-
ways go with such a trial. 41 
The survey concludes that "[i]t was felt by both judges and 
prosecutors that the resultant economy weighed in favor of sepa-
rate trials rather than a joint trial. " 42 If that analysis is correct, 
then in deciding upon a motion for severance, a trial court should 
not expect sequential trials after severance but rather one trial 
followed by disposition of the remaining cases without trial. Sev-
erance would promote, rather than impede, the efficient adminis-
tration of justice and conservation of resources. 
B. Justifications Other Than Efficiency 
Although the principal argument in favor of joint trials is 
efficiency in the administration of criminal justice, other argu-
ments are made as well. To continue with the quotation from 
Justice White's dissent in Bruton v. United States: 43 
It is also worth saying that separate trials are apt to have varying 
consequences for legally indistinguishable defendants. The unfair-
ness of this is confirmed by the common prosecutorial experience 
of seeing codefendants who are tried separately strenuously jockey-
ing for position with regard to who should be the first to be tried.~~ 
Do joint trials ensure, or even tend to. ensure, consistency of 
result? Are separate trials inherently unfair to some of the 
co defendants? 
'Justice White could have been objecting to either or both of 
two inconsistencies when he spoke of the "varying consequences" 
of individual trials: unjustifiably different jury verdicts concern-
ing single past events or unjustifiably different sentences for con-
victed codefendants. According to the first objection, for different 
juries to reach different verdicts on the same evidence is undenia-
bly unjust, and to the extent the legal system can minimize the 
likelihood of this unjustness, it should do so. Therefore, joint 
trials should be held whenever feasible. 
Although superficially appealing, this argument has several 
weaknesses. First, it is usually impossible to determine whether 
separate juries have reached truly inconsistent verdicts. Almost 
41. Id. at 616-17. 
42. Id. at 617. 
43. 391 U.S. 123, 143 (1968). See text at note 15 supra. 
44. 391 U.S. at 143. 
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always the evidence admissible in different trials against alleged 
coparticipants in ·an offense will differ enough to permit different 
treatment by the jury. Similarly, if different lawyers have repre-
sented defendants in sequential trials, differences in their compe-
tency, zeal, or preparation may affect the juries' verdicts. 
Second, our society has made it clear by adopting the jury 
system that it values other considerations more than mere con-
sistency of result. One does not have to acknowledge jury nullifi-
cation to accept that a jury introduces greater uncertainty into 
all trials: this uncertainty is tolerated for the sake of greater pro-
cedural values. In separate, sequential trials, skilled attorneys 
will select juries best suited to the individual clients. Perhaps a 
defendant's right through counsel to select a jury suited to try his 
particular case is an important trial right, one which a joint trial 
with its inevitable "compromise jury"45 should not be able to 
override in the name of "consistency."46 
Third, a joint trial does not guarantee consistency of result 
even when the evidence against each defendant is identical. The 
jury must decide each case individually. It is reversible error to 
instruct a jury that the codefendants must "sink or swim to-
gether" ;47 no matter how much the evidence commands that two 
defendants be treated the same, the court must instruct the jury 
45. In some jurisdictions defendants tried jointly are required to exercise peremptory 
jury challenges jointly. ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STAN• 
DAROS RELATING TO TRIAL BY JURY 72-75 (Approved Draft, 1968) discusses the types of 
provisions dealing with peremptory challenges in joint trials. The Commentary states that 
it may well be desirable to give each defendant at least some challenges which may 
be independently exercised, as only in this way can such a defendant protect him-
self (apart from challenge for cause) from a venireman who is prejudiced only 
against him. Affording such protection has been one of the traditional explanations 
for the peremptory challenge .•. and thus it does not appear that a codefendant 
should be denied all challenges except those to which all codefendants agree. In 
cases involving many defendants, it may be difficult or impossible to obtain such 
agreement. 
Id. at 74-75. 
46. See note 204 infra and accompanying text. Most questioning at voir dire examina-
tion is intended to permit the attorneys to exercise their peremptory challenges more 
intelligently, rather than to uncover grounds for challenges for cause. 
Counsel preparing to select a jury through the exercise of challenges should bear in 
mind the kind of jury that is appropriate for the defense case. Some jurors will be 
bad jurors for the defense in any type of case; others will be good for some kinds of 
cases but not for others. 
lA S. BERNSTEIN, CRIMINAL DEFENSE TECHNIQUES 21-44 (Supp. 1979). The right of peremp• 
tory challenge has been called "one of the most important of the rights secured 'to the 
accused." Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894). 
47. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lester, 223 Pa. Super. Ct. 473, 475, 302 A.2d 609, 
510 (1973) (error for the trial court to instruct the jury that since the defendants are 
charged as accomplices, "they sink or swim together. If they are innocent they are inno-
cent together. If they are guilty- they are ·guilty together.") 
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that it may return a verdict of guilty for one and not guilty for 
the other.48 When a jury in a joint trial has reached what an 
appellate court regards as inconsistent verdicts, the court is likely 
to reverse the judgment against the convicted codefendant out of 
concern for fairness between codefendants. 49 
Finally, the consistency-of-verdict argument makes the same 
faulty assumptiqn that the efficiency argument makes: that re-
lated defendants will each go through a trial. But, as shown 
above, sequential trials are unlikely in that situation, because the 
first case will probably form the basis for disposition of the others 
without trial. 50 To the extent the jury's verdict in the first case 
sets the standard for disposition of the other cases, severance 
avoids potential inconsistent jury verdicts and fosters equal treat-
ment of defendants. 
Justice White's concern for "varying consequences"51 may 
also embrace sentencing of those convicted. Yet such a concern 
is no more justified than the objection to varying verdicts. It is 
nearly impossible to determine if sentences vary unjustifiably 
because the factors that may legitimately influence the imposi-
tion of individual sentences are virtually without limit. 52 In most 
American jurisdictions the trial judge, not the jury, is responsible 
for sentencing one convicted by a jury. 53 If the same judge pre-
sides at all the sequential trials, his sentences should be as consis-
tent as if they were handed down after a joint trial. Indeed, a 
judge may postpone sentencing until each of the cases is com-
pleted and then consider the sentencing of all together. 54 If differ-
48. For example, in State v. Lockamy, 31 N.C. App. 713, 230 S.E.2d 565 (1976), tlie 
trial court did not give a "sink or swim together" charge, but failed to instruct the jury 
clearly that it might find one defendant guilty and the other not guilty. Although the 
evidence against each was identical and there is no indication in the opinion that either 
defendant presented a defense to the government's case, the conviction was reversed: 
"[T]he trial judge must either give a separate final mandate as to each defendant or 
otherwise clearly instruct the jury that the guilt or innocence of one defendant is not 
dependent upon the guilt or innocence of a codefendant." 230 S.E.2d at 568. 
49. See, e.g., People v. Beasley, 41 Ill. App. 3d 550, 353 N.E.2d 699 (1976). 
50. See text at notes 37-42 supra. 
51. See text at note 44 supra. 
52. See, e.g., United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41 (1978) (upholding imposition of 
a more severe sentence of one believed to have committed perjury in his defense on the 
ground that he has thereby demonstrated bleak prospects for rehabilitation). 
53. ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO SEN-
TENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES 43-44 (Approved Draft, 1968) reports that only 
thirteen states permit jury sentencing in noncapital cases. 
54. Another method of achieving the same result would be for the trial judge to select 
and impose sentence upon conviction and to make consistency adjustments through mo-
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ent trial judges preside at sequential trials and sentence those 
convicted, then the potential problems of sentence disparity are 
only slightly more troublesome than the problems in sentencing 
criminal defendants in unrelated cases. 
Are there any other reasons to believe that joint trials might 
be fairer than severed trials? At least three possibilities suggest 
themselves: (1) that a joint trial "serves to give the jury a com-
plete overall view of the whole scheme and helps them see how 
each piece fits into the whole pattern, "55 (2) that a joint trial 
eliminates the unfairness of forcing one defendant to be tried 
before his codefendants, and (3) that a joint trial precludes the 
danger of blame shifting between codefendants. When examined 
closely, however, none of the three is a persuasive argument for 
joint trials. 
The argument for giving the jury an "overall view" fails be-
cause it ignores the prosecutor's ability and duty to present all 
evidence relevant to a defendant's role in an offense whether the 
trial is individual or joint. If the "overall view" argument calls for 
the admission of evidence unrelated to the defendant on trial, 
then it calls for unfair prejudice. If, on the other hand, it seeks 
to encourage the prosecutor to marshall all evidence admissible 
against the defendant, it seeks vigorous prosecution, an aim only 
marginally promoted by the clumsy apparatus of a joint trial. 
Neither interpretation supports a claim that joint trials are fairer 
than individual ones. 
Another justification for joint trials is that they avoid the 
discrimination between the defendant tried first and those tried 
later. The advantages of being tried second or third in a series -
advantages from deterioration of evidence, from discovery of the 
prosecution's case, and from additional grounds for impeachment 
of prosecution witnesses - would seem to support the more uni-
form treatment that joinder imposes on codefendants. Under 
·closer examination, however, those advantages no longer appear 
so extraordinary; indeed, in many instances significant counter-
vailing advantages accompany the first to trial. 
Ordinarily, a defendant, guilty or innocent, prefers to delay 
his trial. Time undeniably weakens the government's case: wit-
tions to reduce sentence. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 35 (permitting reduction within 120 days 
after imposition of sentence or affirmance on appeal). 
55. ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO JOIN• 
DER AND SEVERANCE 39 (Approved Draft, 1968) (quoting from Rakes v. United States, 169 
F.2d 739, 744 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 826 (1948)). 
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nesses die, move from the court's jurisdiction, and lose crisp 
memories;58 prosecutorial zeal wanes and public attention wan-
ders. Severing joint defendants may deny these benefits to the 
one who goes first and may unfairly favor later defendants over 
both the first one and the government. Although few would infer 
from this fact that every defendant should be guaranteed the 
blessing of delay, to believe that its benefits should not be distrib-
uted unequally is quite defensible. 
Another advantage of being tried later is the chance to use 
the first trial to discover the government's case - to study it to 
an extent far beyond that permissible under even the most liberal 
discovery statutes or rules of court. That advantage, however, is 
slimmer than it may appear. In practice, criminal discovery regu-
larly overreaches the strictures of the formal laws. Commonly, 
prosecutors disclose to the defense substantially all the informa-
tion in their case files57 even though statutes and rules of court 
may restrict discovery to only a few items. Furthermore, testi-
mony of witnesses on whether there is probable cause to hold the 
defendant for grand jury indictment, 58 whether a stop, arrest, or 
search was valid, whether an admission or statement was lawfully 
obtained, or how an eyewitness observed the offender often 
emerges in pretrial hearings. 59 While all of these opportunities for 
taking the testimony of a witness under oath' have purposes other· 
than discovery, discovery inevitably follows. 60 In some jurisdic-
tions, the defendant may even depose prosecution witnesses. 61 All 
these ordinary opportunities for pretrial discovery significantly 
56. "If separate trials must be held, then 'the defendants will be placed in unequal 
positions, with some gaining the advantage of disclosure of the Government's case and 
the possibility of witnesses' deaths and fading memories making proof of the charge ever 
more difficult."' Id. (quoting from United States v. Stromberg, 22 F.R.D. 513, 525 
(S.D.N.Y.), affd. in part, revd. in part, 268 F.2d 256 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 863 
(1959). This was probably what Justice White was referring to in his Bruton dissent when 
he noted "the common prosecutorial experience of seeing codefendants who are tried 
separately strenuously jockeying for position with regard to who should be the first to be 
tried." 391 U.S. 123, 143 (1968). See text at note 44 supra. 
57. The practice of informal discovery is discussed in Comment, Texas Criminal 
Discovery, 47 TEXAS L. REv. 1182 (1969). The prosecutor wants defendants to plead guilty 
and sees generous pretrial discovery as the first step toward plea bargaining. 
58. A preliminary hearing is authorized in federal prosecutions by FED. R. CRIM. P. 
5.1. 
59. Pretrial hearings are authorized by FED. R. CRIM. P. 12. 
60. Indeed, discovery is frequently the principal motive for initiating all of these 
proceedings. See A. AMSTERDAM, B. SEGAL & M. MILLER, supra note 26, at 1-121 to -122, 
1-131 to -132 (use of the preliminary hearing as a discovery tool). 
61. See, e.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 39.02 (Vernon 1979) (authorizing 
depositions of prosecution witnesses upon a showing of "a good re!lson"). 
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reduce the· incremental value to defendants not tried first of ob-
serving the first trial. 
Severing cases may also allow defendants who do not go first 
to impeach a witness in a subsequent trial with inconsistent testi-
mony from the first trial. Viewed from one perspective, this does 
not advance the search for truth because any witness who testifies 
more than once about the same subject will vary his statement 
enough to provide skillful counsel with sources of impeachment. 
Viewed from another perspective, however, impeachment assists 
the search for truth, because a witness's testimony should not 
vary substantially from one trial to another. Since the prosecu-
tion calls most witnesses in a criminal case, increasing the availa-
bility of impeachment material presents a tactical advantage for 
the later defendant. 
But as with discovery, various pretrial proceedings routinely 
provide impeachment material. Normally in a felony case1 the 
testimony of at least the police officer in charge of an investiga-
tion is taken at a preliminary hearing.62 Furthermore, major wit-
nesses may testify before the grand jury to assist it in deciding 
whether to return an indictment. 63 Although witnesses are not 
cross-examined before a grand jury, their testimony is ordinarily 
recorded. In some jurisdictions defense counsel routinely receive 
a transcript of such testimony as an aid to cross-examination. 04 
Finally, the increasing use of evidentiary pretrial hearings in 
which the testimony of important witnesses is taken provides 
another opportunity for the defense to obtain impeachment ma-
terial. 65 
The principal advantage in not being tried first is that the 
remaining defendants can better assess whether they should go 
to trial at all. They have had the benefits of a jury's assessment 
of the government's case. They should find the prosecutor more 
willing to discuss disposition without trial, since the first trial has 
probably wrung the maximum publicity from the case and the 
prosecutor may not be anxious to "re-try" it before another jury 
with a different defendant. Against these benefits must be bal-
62. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1 (c) authorizes transcription of the court reporter's notes of a 
preliminary hearing and provision of a copy to the defense attorney. 
63. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(d). 
64: The Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1976), requires disclosure of a government 
witness's testimony before the grand jury after the witness has testified on direct examina-
tion at a trial. 
65. See text at notes 58-59 supra. 
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anced the disadvantages of not being tried first. In a case with a 
high publi~ interest, members of the jury panel are likely to have 
read damaging reports of the previous trial that will hinder the 
defense in selecting a jury. 66 A defendant in custody pending trial 
also has an obvious interest in a prompt trial67 even if conviction 
means a certain prison sentence, since prison conditions are likely 
to be superior to those in a local detention facility. Moreover, if 
the first codefendant to be tried is convicted, he may get a lighter 
sentence by volunteering to testify for the government. 68 Later 
defendants have no such option. 
A final justification for joint trials is that they determine 
guilt or innocence more accurately because they prevent defen-
dants from shifting blame to each other. In separate trials, each 
defendant could take the stand, testify to his innocence, and 
blame the offense on the absent codefendant. Conceivably, sepa-
rate juries might each believe the testimony and acquit both. 69 
Joint trials, however, are a poor solution to this problem. If defen-
dants accused each other in a joint trial, the jury would not neces-
sarily be any more able to decide if one or both were lying; in a 
joint trial, both might be convicted although one was innocent. 
Appellate courts consider it unfair to require a defendant to de-
fend against accusations by both the governme_nt and a codefen-
dant, 70 and would probably order severance in· this situation any-
way. Therefore, this is no justification at all for joint trials. 
II. COSTS OF JOINT TRIALS: COMPLEXITY'S GENERAL IMPEDIMENTS 
TO FAIRNESS AND lNDMDUAL JUSTICE 
Joint trials are more complex to administer than individual 
trials. Complexity reduces a trial's efficiency, but it also has a 
66. However, it is also true that in a case exciting public interest, various pretrial 
evidentiary hearings are likely to have publicized the case before the first trial is heid. 
Under appropriate circumstances and with the consent of the defendants, a trial court 
may close pretrial proceedings to the press and public. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 99 S. 
Ct. 2898 (1979). 
67. The Speedy Trial Act of 1974, § 101, 18 U.S.C. § 3164(b) (1976), provided as an 
interim measure that persons in custody must be brought to trial within 90 days and that 
calendar priority must be given to those cases. Some state speedy trial acts contain similar 
provisions. See, e.g., 'I'Ex. CooE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.17.151, 32A.01 (Vernon Supp.1978). 
68. "Prior trial of the codefendants may allow defense counsel full discovery of the 
prosecution's case in advance of his own trial. On the other hand, if they are convicted, 
they may turn state's evidence in an attempt to win sentencing consideration." A. AM-
STERDAM, B. SEGAL & M. MILLER, supra note 26, at 1-275. 
69. See text at note 181 infra. 
70. See text at notes 176-98 infra. 
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more troubling consequence: complexity sometimes impairs the 
ability of the jury to make fair and accurate determinations of 
individual guilt or innocence. This problem is most severe in a 
mass trial, when the multiplicity of defendants (and usually of 
charges) tends to overwhelm all other aspects of the proceedings. 
Yet even when the participants and charges are fewer, the com-
plexity of a joint trial may confuse a jury about the responsibility 
of the different defendants. At times, the jury may not be con-
fused but may nonetheless so abhor the conduct of some defen-
dants that it finds the remainder guilty by their association with 
them. Courts respond to these dangers with the assumption that, 
by careful control of the proceedings and by appropriate jury 
instructions, they can eliminate the risks of confusion and guilt 
by association. The validity of that assumption is vital to the 
fairness of joint trials. 
A. Mass Trials 
It has been said that "a mass trial is contrary to the basic 
principles of our jurisprudence."71 .The Standards Relating to 
Joinder and Severance require severance of defendants when "it 
is deemed appropriate to promote a fair determination of the guilt 
or innocence of o])e or more defendants."72 The Commentary ex-
plains that severance would be required under that standard 
"when the case is so complex that the trier of fact cannot be 
expected to keep straight the evidence relating to the various 
defendants and charges."73 Despite the reassurance of these gen-
eral statements, 'many courts tolerate mass trials. 74 
71. 1 C. WRIGHT, supra note 9, at 447 (quoting from United States v. Gaston, 37 
F.R.D. 476, 477 (D.D.C. 1965)). 
72. ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO JOIN· 
DER AND SEVERANCE 35 (Approved Draft, 1968). 
73. Id. at 40. 
74. See, e.g., United States v. McLaurin, 557 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 
U.S. 1020 (1977) (10 charges against 15 defendants); United States v. Morrow, 537 F.2d 
120 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 956 (1977) (10 charges against 23 defendants); 
United States v. Braasch, 505 F.2d 139 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 110 (1975) 
(conspiracy charge against 24 defendants); United States v. Barber, 442 F.2d 517 (3d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 846, 404 U.S. 958 (1971) (4 charges against 13 defendants); United 
States v. Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 940 (1963) (8 charges 
against 29 defendants, followed, after declaration of a mistrial, by a retrial of 3 charges 
against 14 defendants); United States v. Agueci, 310 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 
372 U.S. 959 (1963) (30 charges against 10 defendants); Commonwealth v. French, 357 
Mass. 356, 259 N.E.2d 195 (1970), vacated and remanded, 408 U.S. 936 (1972) (4 charges 
against 6 defendants). 
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The Massachusetts "small loans cases, "75 prosecuted in the 
mid-sixties, illustrate the many difficulties of mass trials. A Mas-
sachusetts grand jury investigation of the small loan industry 
yielded seventy indictments against a number of individuals and 
corporations for conspiracy to bribe public officials. The Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts eventually affirmed convictions 
of many defendants, but the trials were judicial nightmares. 
Pretrial motions consumed 75 court days and produced 4700 
pages of transcript. 76 The prosecution divided the cases into two 
groups for jury trial, but in fact the defendants named in each 
trial overlapped substantially. The first jury faced 49 indictments 
including at least 75 charges against 16 defendants;77 the second 
jury heard 21 indictments, including at least 35 charges against 
15 defendants. 78 The first trial lasted five months and produced 
over 7500 pages of transcript;79 the second lasted twelve months 
and produced over 11,800 pages of transcript. 8° Consolidated on 
In United States v. Moreton, 25 F.R.D. 262 (W.D.N.Y. 1960), the government filed 
an indictment charging 2,553 counts against 17 defendants. The trial court carved out for 
trial 2 counts and 3 defendants, concluding: 
[A] single trial of all defendants under this multi-count indictment, as now consti-
tuted, would be prejudicial to the defendants charged. The complex involvement 
of the various defendants and the multiplicity of charges co'iifained in the indict-
ment would render it difficult, if not impossible, for the court to adequately charge 
a jury as to the applicable law with respect to each defendant and for the jury to 
apply that law intelligently in reaching verdicts on the many charges involved. 
25 F.R.D. at 263. 
75. Commonwealth v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 360 Mass. 188, 275 N.E.2d 33 (1971), cert. 
denied, 407 U.S. 910, 407 U.S. 914 (1972). 
76. 360 Mass. at 200-01, 275 N.E.2d at 42. 
77. 360 Mass. at 201, 376-84, 275 N.E.2d at 42, 139-42, app. B. Directed verdicts of 
not guilty were entered on 15 of the 75 charges and jury verdicts were returned on 60. 
Seventy-five must be a minimum figure, since many of the indictments charged more than 
one offense and Appendix B does not disclose how many offenses an indictment charged 
unless there is special reason for doing so (such as a guilty verdict on one count and a not 
guilty verdict on another). 
78. 360 Mass. at 376-84, 275 N.E.2d at 139-42 app. B. The defendants sought to 
invoke the supervisory powers of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts to stay the 
second trial until after the appeal on the first trial had been decided. They argued that 
"they have the burden of trying complex cases while equally complex appeals following 
the first trial are being prosecuted" and that the "rigors of the present trial prevent them 
from properly preparing their cases on appeal; or, conversely, that if their counsel concen-
trate on the appeals, they will be unable adequately to protect their clients in the present 
trial." The court declined to stay the second trial and, as subsequent events made clear, 
decided instead to delay the appeal from the first trial and consolidate it with the appeal 
from the second trial. Barber v. Commonwealth, 353 Mass. 236,238,230 N.E.2d 817,819 
(1967). 
79. 360 Mass. at 201, 275 N.E.2d at 42. 
130. 360 Mass. at 201, 275 N .E.2d at 43. 
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appeal, the two cases consumed 137 pages of the Massachusetts 
Reporter~1 and required a nine-page chart to separate the charges, 
defendants, and verdicts.8~ The appellate court unanimously af-
firmed all the convictions. 
The juries clearly faced a Herculean task. Joinder of defen-
dants anrl: charges led to intricate questions of fact. Much of the 
Commonwealth's evidence was admitted for only a limited pur-
pose - against only some defendants or with respect to only some 
indictments - but sometimes the applicability of limited evi-
dence was expanded to other defendants after further "linking" 
emerged. The court instructed the jury on the use of the limited 
evidence, both before and after it was admitted83 but even with 
81. In the pretrial proceedings and the trials, the defendants took over 5,400 excep-
tions. They made about 700 assignments of error on appeal. 360 Mass. at 201, 275 N .E.2d 
at 43. The court acknowledged that it was able to avoid needless "clutter" of the opinion 
by omitting discussion of many of the assignments of error. It then reassured counsel that 
"we have endeavored to consider and to give scrupulous attention to every assignment of 
error argued by the defendants. If some assignment of error is not specifically referred to 
in this opinion, a conclusion that we did not reflect on it would be far from accurate," 
360 Mass. at 202-03, 275 N.E.2d at 43. 
82. 360 Mass. at 374-76, 275 N.E.2d at 137-42 app. A. 
83. The problems created by the limited use of evidence so pervaded both trials that 
the appellate court was forced to use a footnoting system of alphabetical symbols to 
indicate against whom the particular evidence discussed in the text was admitted: 
[T]hroughout the lengthy trial, items of evidence were admitted subject to 
limitations. In order to recite the evidence without stating each limitation, we have 
adopted the following system ••. which indicates what evidence was admitted 
against which defendants and subsequently expanded to include other defendants. 
Each defendant is referred to in connection with a particular item of evidence by 
footnote [using the first letter of the defendant's surname for identification]. 
Where evidence admitted against a defendant was limited to a specific indictment 
or count thereof, this is stated following the symbol used for that defendant. Where 
original limitations were expanded to include other defendants, following the pre-
liminary ruling by the judge as to the existence of a conspiracy, the expanded 
limitations are shown in parentheses following the original limitations. Thus a 
footnote which reads "P, G, Hly 11976 (H, B)" means that the item of evidence 
referred to by the footnote was originally admitted against Pratt and Glynn, and 
against Hanley only on Indictment 11976, and that following the preliminary ruling 
the limitation was expanded to include Household and Beneficial. 
360 Mass. at 231 n.12, 275 N.E.2d at 59 n.12. 
Presumably the jury did not have the benefit of this evidentiary roadmap. In Massa-
chusetts the judge delivers an oral charge to the jury after the attorneys have argued. See 
Commonwealth v. Therrien, 371 Mass. 203, 355 N.E.2d 913 (1976). The appellate court's 
opinion in Beneficial Finance suggests that, despite the length and complexity of the trials 
in that case, the trial court delivered an oral charge, rather than a written one that the 
jury could use during deliberations. One portion of the court's charge to the jury quoted 
by the appellate court was, "the Commonwealth must prove as to a particular defendant 
. . . that he, by his own actions, words, or conduct entered into an agreement with one 
or more other persons to commit a crime. Now, this is not the same thing as talking to 
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the help of court and counsel, how could a jury fairly and accu-
rately adjudicate cases of such incredible complexity, tried over 
such a length of time, and involving such complicated decisions? 
How could a jury, faced with such confusing questions, determine 
the fate of so many defendants with the sagacity the law 
contemplates? Joinder may have achieved some efficiencies in 
those cases, but did the trials evaluate each defendant as fairly 
as the law demands?84 
B. Jury Confusion and Guilt by Association 
Much more common than mass trials are joint trials whose 
complexities threaten to confuse the jury or whose complications 
might tempt the jury to find defendants guilty by association. 
Claims of jury confusion in joint trials grow from concern that 
even a careful jury may apply evidence erroneously or, in the face 
of momentous and complex proceedings, may abdicate its respon-
sibility to sift the evidence meticulously before deciding individ-
somebody about somebody else's committing a crime." 360 Mass. at 301, 275 N.E.2d at 
98. See text at notes 105-06 infra for a comparison of oral and written jury charges. 
84. In United States v. Agueci, 310 F.2d 817· (2d Cir. 1962), Judge Kaufman, in an 
opinion affirming the convictions of all IO appellants who had been tried in a joint trial, 
discussed the difficulties created by such trials and then blamecf'the United States Attor-
ney for failing to scale down the size of such conspiracy prosecutions: 
This mass-conspiracy case, in presenting us with a great number of difficult 
problems arising in the course of two months of trial, and in which the record 
consumed almost 8000 pages, is not untypical of many cases that have come before 
this Court in the past. . . . The trial of these multiple-defendant conspiracy cases 
poses a great problem for the district judge. We recognize that if a narcotics conspir-
acy is of such dimension as to include a confusing array of defendants, it is inherent 
in the nature of the crime that the trial is certain to be rather protracted. The great 
problem confronting the district judge is therefore one of trial management. The 
jury must constantly be made aware of the fact that there are separate individuals 
on trial and that each must be judged solely on the evidence properly admissible 
against him. The difficulties of compartmentalizing the independent evidence in 
the mass-conspiracy case, and of focussing the attention of the jury on that evidence 
before consideration may be given to hearsay, are so manifest that we would labor 
the point were we to say more • . . . Judges . . . are confined for months on end, 
engaged in trying these cases. 
The solution to these problems of judicial administration of the criminal law 
which we recognize to be difficult to find, is largely in the hands of the United 
States Attorney, for he is in a position in the first instance to determine whether it 
would be more in the interests of criminal justice to restrict the number of defen-
dants tried at any one time. If such were done, then it would be possible to minimize 
the harassing problems arising from the participation of the great number of sepa-
rate counsel representing individual defendants, each pursuing his own course in 
seeking the acquittal of his client. · 
310 F.2d at 840. 
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ual liability. Any joint trial with enough proof of guilt to reach 
the jury invites questions about whether the jury deliberated ra-
tionally. One must always worry that the jury might have reached 
its verdicts through misunderstanding of the entire case, uncer-
tainty about who is supposed to have done what, or confusion 
about what evidence was admissible against whom. 85 
Appellate courts, perhaps reluctant to inquire into jury de-
liberations, have greeted claims of jury confusion with hostility. 
In Opper v. United States, 86 Justice Reed rejected the concept of 
jury confusion: 
To say that the jury might have been confused amounts to nothing 
more than an unfounded speculation that the jurors disregarded 
clear instructions of the court in arriving at their verdict. Our 
theory of trial relies upon the ability of ij jury to follow instruc-
tions. 87 
As Justice Reed suggests, claims of jury confusion are ordinarily 
speculative. The legal system insulates former jurors from the 
very inquiry necessary to establish jury confusion other than by 
inferences from the evidence presented at trial. 88 Many jurisdic-
tions restrict investigation of a jury's deliberations.89 And even 
when presented with evidence of irrational deliberation, most 
trial courts are reluctant to provide full legal remedies.90 In un-
usual circumstancE:ls, an appellate court may infer jury confusion 
from the evidence, but such inference is rare. 91 
85. Of course; there are safeguards against egregious jury confusion in any trial when 
proof of guilt is so insubstantial as to be legally insufficient, compelling an acquittal or a 
reversal on appeal. See FEo. R. CRIM. P. 29; Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978). 
86. 348 U.S. 84 (1954). 
87. 348 U.S. at 95. In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court has recognized the limits 
of juries' abilities to follow the trial court's instructions. See Bruton v. United States, 391 
U.S. 123 (1968); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964). Bruton is examined later. See 
text at notes 127-75 infra. 
88. One can posit policy considerations for these restrictions. Prohibitions on inter-
viewing former jurors may be justified to prevent harassment of former jurors and, indi-
rectly, to encourage citizens to serve on juries. Prohibitions on a juror's impeaching his 
· own verdict may stem from a fear that a juror, remorseful over finding a defendant guilty, 
will fabricate testimony about irrational decisional processes in order to upset the verdict, 
hence the rule that the testimony may go only to external influences on the juror's vote 
that are capable of being corroborated or refuted by other evidence. See note 90 infra. 
89. Interviewing former jurors to uncover jury misconduct is disapproved by a num-
ber of courts. See 2 C. WRIGHT, supra note 9, at 493-94. 
90. Many courts take the position that a juror may not impeach his verdict by 
testimony in a hearing on a motion for new trial. He is permitted, however, to testify to 
extraneous influences upon his decision. See id. at 492-93. Jury confusion in a joint trial 
is not an extraneous influence. Id. 
91. In United States v. Wasson, 568 F.2d 1214, 1222-23 (5th Cir. 1978), the attorney 
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A few jurisdictions have expressed concern over potential 
jury confusion in certain kinds of joint trials. A Colorado rule of 
court provides, "[I]f the court finds that the prosecution prob-
ably will present against a joint defendant evidence, other than 
reputation or character testimony, which would not be admissible 
in a separate trial of the moving defendant," then the court must 
grant a severance. 92 In Wisconsin, case law has produced a similar 
rule: Severance is usually discretionary, but it is required if there 
is "an entire line of evidence relevant to the liability of only one 
defendant [that] may be treated as evidence against all defen-
dants by the trier of fact."93 
The danger that a jury may find guilt by association is closely 
related to the danger of jury confusion. In each the jury may 
irrationally apply evidence to find guilt. But a jury that finds a 
for the government conceded in jury argument that there y;as ·insufficient proof that one 
defendant participated in the conspiracy. Nevertheless, the jury convicted him of that 
offense. This and another conviction from the same trial were reversed on appeal on the 
ground that the jury obviously was confused as to what evidence applied to which defen-
dants. ~ 
By contrast, in United States v. Fuel, 583 F.2d 987 (8th Cir. 1978}, three defendants 
were charged with conspiracy to commit mail fraud and with various substantive mail 
fraud offenses allegedly arising out of an insurance fraud scheme., '.!;'he jury convicted them 
of conspiracy and of several substa1;1tive counts, but the con.spiracy convictions were 
reversed on appeal because of insufficient evidence of agreement among the defendants. 
-The appellate court then affirmed convictions on the substantive counts, rejecting a claim 
that the cases should have been severed because there existed an unacceptable risk of jury 
confusion: 
We recognize that there is an inherent danger in a joint trial that the jury will 
convict on the basis of the cumulative evidence produced at trial, rather than on 
the basis of the quantum of evidence relating to each defendant .... However, a 
defendant is not automatically entitled to severance because the evidence against 
a codefendant is more damaging than the evidence against him. 
Here, the trial court carefully instructed the jury that it should weigh the 
evidence against each defendant individually .... While the evidence presented' 
at trial was complex and confusing, the trial court could reasonably have believed 
that the jury was capable of compartmentalizing the evidence. The fact that it 
failed to do so with respect to some of the grounds is insufficient justification for 
us to now hold that the trial court abused its discretion in denying severance. 
583 F.2d at 988. But see United States v. Lane, 584 F.2d 60 (5th Cir. 1978) (finding an 
unacceptable risk of jury confusion in a case in which the government failed to prove its 
conspiracy charge). 
92. COLO. R. CRIM. P. 14. The defendants' convictions for delivery of LSD and hashish 
were reversed in People v. Story, 182 Colo. 122, 511 P.2d 492 (1973), because the judge 
refused to give a cautionary instruction about evidence that a third· defendant told an 
undercove; officer that he had sold LSD to high school students. New Mexico has enacted 
a similar rule. N.M.R. CRIM. P. 34. See State v. Volkman, 86 N.M. 529,525 P.2d 889 (Ct. 
App. 1974). 
93. State v. Nutley, 24 Wis. 2d 527, 543, 129 N.W.2d 155, 171 (1964), cert. denied, 
380 U.S. 918 (1965). 
1404 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 77:1379 
defendant guilty by association fully understands the evidence; 
nonetheless, it paints each member of the group with the same 
brush of blame, without pausing to ponder the difficult questions 
of individual responsibility. Justice Jackson, concurring in 
Krulewitch v. United States, 94 expressed the danger of guilt by 
association: 
A co-defendant in a conspiracy trial occupies an uneasy seat. 
There generally will be evidence of wrong-doing by somebody. It 
is difficult for the individual to make his own case stand on its own 
merits in the minds of jurors who are ready to believe that birds 
of a feather are flocked together. If he is silent, he is taken to admit 
it and if, as often happens, co-defendants can be prodded into 
accusing or contradicting each other, they convict each other.u:; 
Joinder, therefore, places upon defendants the heavy burden 
of proving nonparticipation in the criminal activities of the group 
the prosecutor has defined with his joinder decisions. While a 
defendant who has his trial severed may carry that burden and 
win an acquittal, joined defendants face a harder task. Perhaps 
this is what courts mean when they acknowledge that severance 
ordinarily increases a defendant's chances of acquittal.00 
The problems of jury confusion and guilt by association 
emerge most clearly in the joinder of minor and major figures. 
The jury may c'onfuse the evidence and apply damaging testi-
mony against the major defendant to convict the minor one. Even 
if the jury keeps the evidence separate, it may decide the minor 
figure must be. guilty just because of his connection with the 
major one. Furthermore, even beyond the risk of confusion and 
guilt by association, it seems unfair to compel a minor figure to 
undergo the cost and anxiety of defending himself in a major trial, 
most of which involves only his codefendants, 97 and which may 
unfairly prejudice him. 
Although some appellate courts have reversed the conviction 
of minor figures involved in major jury trials, 98 others have offered 
two justifications for joining the minor figure. First, they say, 
94. 336 U.S. 440, 445 (1949). 
95. 336 U.S. at 454. 
96. One finds statements in appellate opinions that severance is not required merely 
because the defendant would have a better chance of acquittal in a separate trial, 8ee 1 
C. WRIGHT, supra note 9, at 443-44. 
97. See id. 
98. See, e.g., United States v. Mardian, 546 F.2d 973 (D.C. Cir. 1976); United States 
v. Donaway, 447 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1971); Linn v. State, 505 P.2d 1270 (Wyo,), cert. 
denied, 411 U.S. 983 (1973). 
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joining a minor figure encourages the prosecution of unimportant 
criminals because the prosecutor is likely to dismiss a case 
against a minor figure if obtaining a conviction would require the 
same dedication of resources as needed to convict a major figure. 99 
This may be true in cases where, for example, the minor figure's 
case is set first for trial, 100 but it is more likely that a minor figure 
will agree to testify for the prosecution in exchange for not being 
prosecuted or for a reduced sentence. Second, those courts say, if 
the jury is searching for a defendant to acquit, it will surely acquit 
the minor figure, even though he might have been convicted if 
tried alone. 101 While such acquittal is not inconceivable, it seems 
just as likely that the jury will convict in a joint trial the minor 
figure whom it might acquit if he were tried separately. And 
either way, the joint trial fails to produce an accurate determina-
tion of individual guilt. · 
Finally, guilt by association and jury confusion pose espe-
cially tricky problems for an appellate court asked to correct un-
fairness: appellate courts· are not likely to find either type of error 
if the jury acquitted at least one of the joined defendants of at 
least one charge. The court in such a situation usually holds that 
the jury's acquittal demonstrated its ability to give attention to 
individual guilt or innocence and to follow the trial court's in-
structions.102 For obvious administrative reasons, appellate courts 
do not ordinarily delve further into the evidentiary record to de-
termine whether the acquittal seems rationally justified or 
whether it is itself evidence of jury confusion. 
C. The Curative Powers of Jury Instructions 
The law, like Justice Reed, 103 assumes that juries are willing 
and able to follow the trial court's instructions in deciding 
whether the government has proved its case. It is too cynical a 
view of jury behavior to assume that a jury deliberately ignores 
99. See, e.g., Woodcock v. Amaral, 511 F.2d 985,994 n.21 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 423 
U.S. 841 (1974); United States v. Cohen, 145 F.2d 82, 95 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 
799 (1944). 
100. The prosecutor may decide that the danger of revealing his case before trial 
outweighs the benefits of convicting a minor figure. 
101. See, e.g., United States v. Hines, 455 F.2d 1317, 1334 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 
406 U.S. 969, 406 U.S. 975 (1972). 
102. See, e.g., United States v. Braasch, 505 F.2d 139, 149-50 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. 
denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975), appeal dismissed, 542 F.2d 442 (7th Cir. 1976); United States 
v. Hines, 455 F.2d 1317, 1334 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 969,406 U.S. 975 (1972). 
103. See text at note 87 supra. 
D 
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the court's instructions. Indeed, in other contexts, such as claims 
of judicial misconduct, the law assumes that the jury clings to 
every word the trial judge speaks and examines the judge's tone 
of voice, demeanor, and conduct for hints about the court's view 
of the evidence.104 But assuming jurors want to follow the court's 
instructions in a joint trial, can they? The law in many jurisdic-
tions does not help the jury. In federal prosecutions, the trial 
judge may charge the jury orally and then refuse to provide it 
with a written copy to examine during its deliberations. um In a 
case with multiple defendants, complex charges, and lengthy in-
structions, tµis procedure virtually assures the jury's uncertainty 
about the law applicable to the case. In other jurisdictions, the 
trial court must not only read the charge to the jury but must also 
provide it with a written copy of the charge to take to the jury 
room. 106 
In jojnt trials, the court's instructions frequently attempt to 
compartmentalize the evidence the jury has heard into clusters 
that may be considered against each defendant. 107 The jury may 
be capable of following these instructions as long as logic does not 
require it to apply evidence across the compartmental wall the 
trial court has tried to construct. The classic example of attempt-
104. See, e.g., 2 C. WRIGHT, supra note 9, at 505 ("The jury is highly sensitive to every 
judicial utterance, and the judge's words to the jury carry an authority bordering on the 
irrefutable.") 
105. Cf. id. at 283. ("In some states the court is required to give the jury a written 
copy of his instructions to take to the jury room. This practice is desirable in complex 
cases, but it is left to the discretion of the trial judge and it is not error either to give the 
jury a copy of the instructions or to refuse to do so." (footnotes omitted)). ,, 
106. See TEX. CooE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 36.14, 36.18 (Vernon 1979); note 105 
supra. Attorneys can enhance jury comprehension under either system by discussing the 
charge in their jury arguments. Counsel are more likely to discuss a written charge than 
an oral charge because a written charge will probably have stronger impact on the jury's 
deliberations than an oral charge. When the charge is oral and complex, counsel may 
tend to ignore the charge in argument, believing that the jury cannot understand it even 
with argument. When some judges in jurisdictions with written charges instruct the jury 
about deliberation, they suggest that after the jury has selectep a foreman he should 
read the charge of the court to the jury before the deliberations begin. 
107. Frequently, trial courts also instruct the jury about the limited uses to which 
evidence may be put as soon as it is introduced, as well as in the final charge to the jury. 
For example, in Linn v. State, 505 P.2d 1270 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 983 (1973), 
three persons were being prosecuted as accessories before the fact to murder. A great part 
of the state's case consisted of conversations between two of the defendants. The trial 
court instructed the jury at least fifteen times that nothing said in those conversations 
was evidence against the defendant who was not present. The instruction was given so 
frequently that the trial court abbreviated it to be "the same admonition" or "please 
remember the admonition at all times." 505 P.2d at 1273. Although the evidence against 
the third defendant was tenuous, the jury convicted. The appellate court reve~sed. 
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ing that impossible feat is Delli Paoli v. United States, ws in which 
the Supreme Court approved an instruction admonishing the jury 
to disregard a statement in a codefendant's confession detailing 
the defendant's role in the offense. 109 Although Bruton v. United 
States 110 overruled Delli Paoli, for years the law espoused what 
thoughtful persons universally agreed was an unmitigated fiction 
- that the jury was capable of following such an instruction. 111 
Finally, Justice Brennan, writing for the majority in Bruton, ac-
knowledged that at times juries are simply unable to follow in-
structions: 
Not every admission of inadmissible hearsay or other evidence can 
be considered to be reversible error unavoidable through limiting 
instructions; instances occur in almost every trial where inadmissi-
ble evidence creeps in, usually inadvertently . . . . It is not unrea-
sonable to conclude that in many such cases the jury can and will 
follow the trial judge's instructions to disregard such information. 
Nevertheless, as we recognized in Jackson v. Denno, . . . there are 
some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, 
follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so 
vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations 
of the jury system cannot be ignored.112 
108. 352 U.S. 232 (1957). 
109. Dissenting, Justice Frankfurter noted that the traditional solution to the prob-
lem of an extrajudicial confession that incriminates a party on trial with the declarant is 
to admit the confession in its entirety and to admonish the jury not to consider it against 
anybody except the declarant. "The fact of the matter is that too often such admonition 
against misuse is intrinsically ineffective in that the effect of such a nonadmissible decla-
ration cannot be wiped from the brains of the jurors. The admonition therefore becomes 
a futile collocation of words and fails of its purpose as a legal protection to defentlants 
against whom such a declaration should not tell." 352 U.S. at 247. 
110. 391 U.S. 123 (1968). In Bruton, the trial court admitted a confession implicating 
a joined defendant. The trial court instructed the jury at the time of the confession's 
admission and again during its charge to the jury that the confession was being received 
only because it might have a bearing on the declarant's guilt or innoc~nce and that the 
jury was not to use it in deciding the defendant's fate. This was the procedure approved 
in Delli Paoli. Building upon its holding in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964) (recog-
nizing limits upon a jury's ability to disregard highly incriminating information), the 
Court concluded that the risk that the jury had used the codefendant's confession in 
determining the defendant's guilt, although prohibited from doing so by the trial court's 
instructions, was too great to permit the conviction to stand. 
111. The rationally persuasive power of such accusations, and the futility of instruct-
ing a jury not to draw the natural inferences from them, is illustrated by Judge Learned 
Hand's famous statement in Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 285 U.S. 556 (1932), that the rule "probably furthers, rather than impedes, the 
search for truth, and this perhaps excuses the device which satisfies form while it violates 
substance; that is, the recommendation to the jury of a mental gymnastic which is beyond, 
not only their powers, but anybody's else." 
112. 391 U.S. at 135. The Court later made Bruton fully retroactive and applied it to 
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Stein v. New York 113 was a second example of asking the jury 
to do the impossible. There, the Supreme Court upheld submit-
ting a confession to the jury with instructions that it should deter-
mine whether it was voluntary and should disregard it if it was 
not voluntarily given. The Court repudiated this position some 
years later in Jackson v. Denno114 because of grave doubts about 
whether the jury could perform such tasks. Yet to this day state 
judges frequently present admissibility issues to the jury in proce-
dures that closely parallel those in Stein. 115 
Bruton and Jackson were major departures from the ironclad 
assumption that juries follow instructions, but they did not her-
ald a complete reappraisal of that doctrine. Today some trial 
courts still presume that juries can understand and apply extraor-
dinarily complicated instructions in joint trials. 116 Some appellate 
state criminal processes. Roberts v. Russel, 392 U.S. 293 (1968). Bruton, however, has been 
held inapplicable to jury-waived trials because, at least in the absence of evidence in the 
record to the contrary, it is presumed that the trial judge knew his duty to ignore the 
accusatory portion of a confession and in fact did so. See, e.g., Cockrell v. Oberhauser, 
413 F.2d 256, 258 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 944 (1969). This position has also been 
taken in juvenile cases in which the respondent did not have the choice of a jury trial. 
See, e.g., In re L.J.W., 370 A.2d 1333, 1336 (D.C. App. 1977). 
113. 346 U.S. 156 (1953). 
114. 378 U.S. 368 (1964). 
115. For example, in Huffman v. State, 450 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1970), 
vacated and remanded, 408 U.S. 936 (1972), the state called a witness whom the defendant 
contended was his common-law wife. Under state law, if the witness and defendant were 
married, the witness was not competent to testify against the defendant. The trial court 
concluded that the resolution of that question depended upon issues of fact. It submitted 
those issues to the jury with instructions that if it found that the witness was married to 
the defendant it should disregard all of her damaging testimony. The appeals court ap-
proved of this procedure, rejecting the defendant's contention that the trial court should 
have itself made the admissibility determinations of fact, that the question should have 
been submitted to the jury in the form of special issues, or that the question should have 
been submitted to a different jury from the body empaneled to determine guilt or inno-
cence. 
. 116. Woodcock v. Amaral, 511 F.2d 985 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 841 
(1975), involved a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Massachusetts small 
loans cases described in text at notes 75-84 supra. On the claim of jury confusion, the First 
Circuit said, 
To charge that the jury would convict the appellant solely on the basis of 
evidence which did not directly implicate him is an indictment on the jury system 
itself. . • . Whether the jury was able to follow the limiting instructions of the 
judge with the precision of a computer is not the relevant inquiry. It is rather 
whether the appellant received a fundamentally fair trial in light of the legitimate 
interests of the Commonwealth in trying him jointly with his coconspirators. In this 
connection we see nothing in the evidence, the number of defendants, or the rulings 
of the trial judge which would warrant a conclusion that the sheer complexity of 
this trial prevented the jury from appraising the independent evidence against the 
appellant and meting out individual justice under the law. 
511 F.2d at 995. 
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courts conclude that joined defendants -must be presumed to re-
ceive a fair trial as long as the trial court instructs the jury about 
compartmentalization and mentions that each defendant must 
be judged individually.117 The Fifth Circuit has said: 
We concede that joint trials, and especially those involving many 
defendants, carry substantial risks of manifest unfairness. At the 
same time, it is beyond question that such trials are now an ac-
cepted and even necessary aspect of our judicial system. This is 
because our system will tolerate· the risk of unfairness so long as 
careful efforts are made to ensure that the inequities are kept in 
check,118 
Are the inequities that stem from the complexity of a joint trial 
kept in check? In many trials they surely are not. And we have 
not yet begun to consider all the particular forms of prejudice that 
may afflict a defendant because of the special events that can 
happen only in joint trials. Perhaps we should reconsider 
whether, in light of the "substantial risks of manifest unfairness," 
joint trials should continue to be thought "an accepted and even 
necessary aspect of our j~dicial system." 
ill. COSTS OF JOINT T1mµ,s: CREATION OR AGGRAVATION OF 
PARTICULAR PREJUDICES 
This Section examines the prejudices that joint trials, when 
combined with other factors in a particular case, may create or 
aggravate. It principally analyzes foreseeable prejudices that 
must be alleged before trial, giving only limited discussion to 
unforeseeable prejudices that arise during trial. It concludes that 
trial and appellate courts have consistently undervalued the pre-
judicial effects of joint trials. 
"Prejudice" as used here has two distinct meanings. In one 
sense it means a condition or event creating a substantial risk 
117. See 2 C. WRIGHT, supra note 9, at 339-40. Wright notes: 
In cases in which multiple defendants are being tried, particular care is required 
in the instructions. If evidence is admitted against one defendant but not against 
another, the jury must be instructed about this. . . . 
In a conspiracy case against numerous defendants of varying degrees ofinvolve-
ment in the confederation, so that possibilities of injustice to particular individuals 
become greater, extraordinary precaution is.required in order that the instructions 
shall scrupulously safeguard each defendant individually, as far as possible, from 
loss of identity in the mass. · 
[Footnotes omitted.] 
118. United States v. McLaurin, 557 F.2d 1064, 1074 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 
1020 (1977). See also United States v. Morrow, 537 F.2d 120, 136-37 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. 
denied, 430 U.S. 956 (1977). 
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that the jury will find against a defendant irrationally. For exam-
ple, a jury may find one defendant guilty because it objects to a 
codefendant's criminal record119 or because it objects to a codefen-
dant's lifestyle. 120 But "prejudice" more often means a condition 
or event that unfairly permits a jury to infer guilt quite rationally. 
For example, a jury may find both defendants guilty because each 
blamed the other for the offense. 121 Either form of prejudice could 
justify severance. Nonetheless, appellate courts rarely overturn 
trial court refusals to sever: 
Joinder of defendants is very frequently prejudicial. Though the 
reluctance of courts to grant relief from such prejudice has been 
sharply criticized, the usual judicial attitude is that persons jointly 
indicted should be tried together except for the most compelling 
reasons. . . . The burden is put on the defendants to make a 
strong showing of prejudice in order to obtain [relief from prejudi-
cial joinder]. With such a test, it is hardly surprising that in most 
cases relief has been denied. 122 
This reluctance to grant severance after trial grows in part from 
the many procedural difficulties of moving for severance. There 
is no good time to assert prejudicial joinder. Asserting it before 
trial is speculative; asserting it during trial is disruptive; and 
asserting it on appeal invites hindsight deeming the error harm-
less.123 
The most appropriate time to seek severance is before the 
trial. Understandably enough, statutes and rules uniformly re-
quire that a motion for severance be made before trial unless the 
grounds for severance are not then apparent: 124 The current sys-
tem of liberal joinder would collapse if defendants could sandbag 
the prosecution by waiting until the trial begins to reveal known 
grounds for severance. But predicting trial prejudice before the 
trial begins is guessing at best. A pretrial motion for severance 
must show that joinder will harm a defendant during trial, and 
119. See text at notes 285-95 infra. 
120. See text at notes 296-99 infra. 
121. See text at notes 176-98 infra. 
122. 1 C. WRIGHT, supra note 9, at 441-42 (footnotes omitted). 
123. This point is made in UNIFORM RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 472, Comment at 
239 (Approved Draft, 1974): 
[I]t is difficult to ascertain the degree of prejudice before trial; once the trial is 
under way there is great reluctance to grant a severance and allow some defendants 
a fresh start; and on appeal there is even greater reluctance to find the trial judge's 
denial of the motion erroneous. 
124. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b) provides in part: "The following must be raised prior to 
trial: ... (5) Requests for a severance of ..• defendants under Rule 14," 
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it is often impossible to predict such events as a codefendant's 
disruptive conduct125 or flight from the jurisdiction.126 More com-
monly, the basis for the claim is known, but the extent of the 
prejudice is speculative: it may depend upon defense tactics or 
any number of other considerations. Most often, the defense at-
torney may suspect prejudice from joinder, but be unable to fore-
see the exact events that will harm his client. Thus, courts often 
must dismiss pretrial claims of prejudice because they are too 
speculative. 
Furthermore, asserting prejud~ce before the trial may be 
tactically difficult. The burden of showing grounds for severance 
· falls upon the defense, but to assert those grounds in the detail 
that courts reasonably require may mean giving away the defen-
dant's case, a· harm that will probably remain even if the court 
grants severance. Yet if the court denies the motion, and grounds 
for prejudice do emerge, the defendant needs only to show an 
appellate court that he raised the issue. Therefore, the defendant, 
fearing that the trial judge will not grant severance in any case, 
may raise the possibility of prejudice in a pretrial motion but hold 
back strategic information so that the judge must deny the mo-
tion. The issue is preserved for appeal, but the most economical 
opportunity for severance is lost. 
The middle of a trial is probably the worst time for a sever-
ance motion. It thrusts a difficult decision onto the trial judge, a 
decision with no adequate alternatives to choose among. The 
impetus for the motion may be a clearly prejudicial event, and 
the court will find a mistrial justified. Sometimes a mistrial will 
be needed for all defendants; at other times mid-trial severance 
of only one defendant will be adequate. Either solution, however, 
sacrifices any economies of joinder after the judge has already 
endured all the headaches of a joint trial. Even if only one defen-
dant is severed, any efficiencies of trying the remaining defen-
dants together may be offset by an increased risk of reversible 
error in administering the trial. Therefore, the trial judge is likely 
to refuse severance, sending all cases to the jury with a promise 
that he will take a fresh look at the problem if the jury returns 
guilty verdicts. 
The appellate court confronted with a claim of prejudicial 
joinder is often in an even more difficult position. An appellate 
125. See text at notes 300-12 infra. 
126. See text at notes 300-12 infra. 
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judge may feel that, had he faced the question, he would have 
granted the pretrial motion to sever; but the law permits reversal 
only for abuse of discretion. And more than a legal standard 
blocks an appellate judge's path to reversing a decision he dis-
agrees with. Reversal would require retrial of a case that was 
originally joined to save the time and resources of multiple trials. 
Even if the trial decision were an abuse of discretion, the effi-
ciency questions give the appellate court a strong incentive to 
play factfinder and deem the error "harmless." That incentive is 
present in all cases, but severance claims on appeal amplify it by 
asking the court to review all the evidence and analyze.the effect 
of joinder on the entire structure of the trial; most appellate 
claims look to the admissibility of only a single piece of evidence. 
Not surprisingly, appellate courts regularly find prejudicial join-
der to be harmless and profess to be comfortable in doing so. 
Because there is no good time or way to sever defendants who 
have been joined, the specific and recurring prejudices of joinder 
must be considered earlier - when deciding whether joint trials 
are appropriate at all. If courts are not able to respond to signifi-
cant prejudices effectively, any efficiencies of joint trials are 
quickly offset. The remainder of this Section investigates those 
prejudices and the efforts to mitigate them. 
A. Codefendant's Confession Implicates Defendant 
One danger peculiar to joint trials is that a codefendant may 
confess before trial and accuse another defendant of complicity 
in the crime. The prosecution will want to introduce the confes-
sion against the confessing codefendant, but the defendant who 
did not confess must be protected from prejudice. In Bruton v. 
United States121 the Supreme Court held that admitting a code-
fendant's confession that implicated another defendant violated 
the defendant's right of confrontation. The Court held severance 
the most appropriate remedy. Recently, however, the Court has 
drawn back from the strict requirements of Bruton, prosecutors 
have devised techniques to avoid severance, and the dangers of 
prejudice have reappeared. The cases in this area show not only 
how insensitive courts are to prejudice arising from joinder, but 
also how far they will go to preserve joinder, even in the face of 
Supreme Court disapproval. 
The most obvious alternative to severance on Bruton grounds 
127. 391 U.S. 123 (1968). See text at notes 107-12 supra. 
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is for the prosecution to announce that it does not intend to 
introduce the offending confession.128 Although that is a simple, 
and realistic, 129 solution to Bruton severance problems, it is not 
foolproof, because the prosecutor may not be able to keep his 
word. Prosecutors have been known to try to sneak evidence in 
even though they indicated at pretrial conference that they would 
not. 130 Moreover, a prosecutor can use an accusatory confession at 
trial even though it is not introduced into evidence. He might, for 
example, threaten a confessing defendant with perjury if he does 
not repeat his confession on the stand. 131 Clearly a prosecutor's 
promise not to use evidence is a poor substitute for the protection 
of Bruton. · 
A second alternative is redaction - deleting the accusatory 
portions of the confession while preserving its substance. The 
128. As noted in note 124 supra, severance motions must be made before trial if the 
grounds are known. Rules of court frequently contemplate that severance motions wili 
be based on accusatory confessions of codefendants and provide for litigating that sever-
ance ground. For example, Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides 
in part: "In ruling on a motion by a defendant for severance the court may order the 
attorney for the government to deliver to the court for inspection in camera any statements 
or confessions made by the defendants which the government intends to introduce in 
evidence at the trial." 
129. Confessions appear to be most frequently obtained from suspects when other 
evidence of guilt is strong. Project, Inte"ogations in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 
76 YALE L.J. 519 (1967). Refraining from using a confession, therefore, although damaging 
to a prosecutor's case, frequently leaves ample evidence of guilt for the jury. 
130. For example, in United States v. Taylor, 508 F.2d 761 (5th Cir. 1975), two people 
were charged with bank robbery. The defendant moved for severance on Bruton grounds, 
and the prosecution countered by saying it did not intend to introduce the codefendant's 
third confession, the one incriminating the defendant, in the trial. On that representation 
the trial court denied severance. On re-direct examination of a federal agent at the trial, 
the prosecutor brought out testimony about the third confession, contending that the 
defendant had "opened the door" on cross-examination of the agent. The court of appeals 
reversed the conviction on the ground that the defendant's cross-examination had not 
opened the door; but the significant point is that the prosecutor was obviously seeking 
any opportunity to use the damaging confession he had agreed not to use. See also United 
States v. Glover, 506 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1974). 
131. In People v. Hurst, 396 Mich. 1, 238 N.W.2d 6 (1976), the defendant and his 
girlfriend were prosecuted for the homicide of their child. A motion for severance was 
made on the ground of antagonistic defenses. The girlfriend had told police the child had 
died from a beating by the defendant, while he claimed that the child had died from 
falling down a flight of stairs. Severance was denied when the state said it did not intend 
to use the mother's statement in the trial. She testified in her own defense in the joint 
trial and, on cross-examination, denied that the father had beaten the child with a belt. 
Outside the presence of the jury she was confronted with her confession and reminded of 
her liability for perjury. In the presence of the jury she then recanted her earlier testimony 
and repeated the accusation she had made in her confession. The Michigan Supreme 
Court reversed the father's conviction, but on the ground of antagonistic defenses. See text 
at notes 176-98 infra for a discussion of antagonistic defenses as a ground for severance. 
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prosecutor can then introduce it against the declarant without 
violating the confrontation rights of codefendants. Often, of 
course, one cannot remove all references to the participation of 
another person without materially altering the confession. Such 
radical editing could falsely suggest that the declarant admitted 
sole culpability for the offense. 132 For that reason, trial courts 
ordinarily obscure the identities of other named participants but 
permit the jury to hear a confession asserting that others partici-
pated. When such limited editing is employed, however, redac-
tion presents a basic problem: Is it really effective, or does it 
make a game of the confession, inviting the jury to "fill in the 
blank" with the name of the defendant? In many cases, the edited 
statement makes it "as clear as pointing and shouting"133 that the 
other defendant on trial is the "another person"134 or "X" 135 
named in the confession. Indeed, some trial courts, perhaps mis-
understanding the purpose of Bruton, have as much as instructed 
the jury on what name to insert in the blanks. 136 And appellate 
courts continue to uphold trial decisions to admit a Bruton con-
fession with what amounts to a sham deletion. 137 It is not surpris-
132. See, e.g., Matthews v. State, 353 So. 2d 1274 (Fla. App. 1978) (A and B are 
charged with aggravated battery by kicking a drunk-tank cellmate; B moves to delete 
statement in A's confession that A was wearing tennis shoes, since that would imply that 
B inflicted the major injuries); People v. Clark, 42 Ill. App. 3d 472, 355 N.E.2d 619 (1976) 
(A, B, and C are prosecuted; A confesses to committing the crime with B but does not 
name C); State v. Montgomery, 182 Neb. 737, 157 N.W.2d 196 (1S68) (A confesses to 
robbery but claims he was coerced into doing so by B). 
133. Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 253 (1969). 
134. State v. Herd, 14 Wash. App. 959, 546 P.2d 1222 (1976), petition for review 
denied, 88 Wash. 2d 1005 (1977), held that the accusation relating to "another person" 
was ambiguous in light of the facts and that the error, if any, was harmless in light of the 
overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt as the second person involved in the 
offense. The fll'St of those holdings seems incorrect in light of the facts of the case as stated 
by the court in the companion case. See State v. Kimball, 14 Wash. App. 951, 546 P.2d 
1217 (1976). 
135. Sims v. State, 265 Ind. 647, 358 N.E.2d 746 (1977). 
136. In Tate v. State, 556 P.2d 1014 (Okla. Crim. App. 1976), Tate and Biggoose were 
tried jointly for J?urglary. A police officer testified that Biggoose told him that "he boosted 
me up" to gain entrance into the building. The trial court sustained an objection on 
Bruton grounds, but then instructed the jury: "You jurors disregard the statement by the 
witness concerning the description of the assistance of the boosting that the witness here 
stated Mr. Biggoose said that Mr. Tate gave him. It should be stricken from consideration 
when you are determining the issues in this case because I'm ruling that that is inadmissi-
ble evidence." 556 P.2d at 1019. Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Nagle, 253 Pa. Super. 
Ct. 133, 140, 384 A.2d 1264, 1268 (1978), the trial court literally filled in the blanks for 
the jury in its instructions, informing the jury that confessions that name codefendants 
are admissible if the names of the codefendants are deleted. 
137. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 
914 (1975); State v. Jenkins, 340 So. 2d 157 (La. 1976); State v. Herd, 14 Wash. App. 959, 
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ing, therefore, that the American Bar Association approves of 
redaction only in limited circumstances.138 
A third alternative to severance on Bruton grounds occurs 
when the defendant accused in a confession has an opportunity 
to cross-examine the confessing codefendant. In Nelson v. 
O'Neil, 139 the Supreme Court held that the opportunity for cross-
examination preserves the defendant's right of confrontation. 
O'Neil had not actually cross-examined his codefendant, 140 and 
many courts would not have let him do so, since the codefen-
dant's in-court testimony was not damaging. 141.Nevertheless, the 
Court held that no Bruton error had been committed because 
when the codefendant took the stand he became available for 
"full and effective" cross-examination.142 
One might wonder whether O'Neil opportunities for cross,. 
examination are an adequate substitute for Bruton severance, 
which would keep the jury from ever learning of the codefendant's 
out-of-court confession at all. If, as in O'Neil, the codefendant 
denies the truth of the out-of-court statement or denies making 
it, the jury will probably think the denial self-serving and give 
greater credence to the confession, including its accusation of the 
defendant. Cross-examining such a codefendant would only draw 
546 P.2d 1222 (1976), petition for review denied, 88 Wash. 2d 1005 (1977). Alternatively, 
courts have held that the deletion was effective and that if it was not, the Bruton error 
was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt. See text at 
notes 160-75 infra. 
138. The American Bar Association Standards approve of redaction, "provided that, 
as deleted, the confession will not prejudice the moving defendant." ABA PROJECT ON 
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO JOINDER AND SEVERANCE 
§ 2.3(a)(ii) (Supp. 1988). In the Tentative Draft of the same standard, admission of a 
confession in a joint trial was approved if "all references to the moving defendant have 
been effectively deleted ..•. " Id. at § 2.3(a)(ii) (Tent. Draft 1967). The change in 
language was made to emphasize the need for caution in redaction. See id. at §§ 3-4 
(Supp. 1968). The Comment warns that "courts must exercise great caution in permitting 
the prosecution to elect the deletion alternative. • . . In a great many cases the deletion 
alternative simply will not be available, as it will be impossible to remove all references 
to participation of another person in the crime without changing materially the substance 
of the statement." Id. 
139. 402 U.S. 622 (1971). 
140. O'Neil and Runnels were jointly tried for kidnapping, robbery, and vehicle theft. 
In its case in chief, the prosecution presented a police officer's testimony that when 
Runnels was arrested he confessed to the offenses and named O'Neil as his confederate. 
The trial court instructed the jury that it could consider Runnels's statement only against 
him and not against O'Neil. Runnels later testified in his own defense, denied making the 
statement, and called it untrue. He then testified to an alibi. On cross-examination he 
stuck to his story in every particular. O'Neil then testified to the same alibi. 
141. See note 229 infra. · 
14~. 402 U.S. at 626 (quoting from California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970)). 
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the jury's attention to the accusatory portion of the out-of-court 
statement.143 If, on the other hand, the codefendant stands by his 
out-of-court statement, then the defendant may certainly cross-
examine the codefendant. Such a situation pits the defendants 
against each other, however, and an increasing number of courts 
recognize that sort of antagonism as grounds for severance or 
mistrial. 144 
O'Neil presents a second problem: in such a situation the 
court need not instruct the jury not to consider the codefendant's 
statement as evidence against the defendant; 145 indeed, a trial 
court would appear, as a matter of federal constitutional law, to 
be correct in instructing the jury to give such weight to the accu-
sation as it thinks proper. The prosecutor would also be permitted 
to use the out-of-court accusation in argument. In contrast, in a 
separate trial, the jury would not ever hear of the codefendant's 
confession. Thus, the Supreme Court has allowed "powerfully 
incriminating"146 evidence, often repudiated by its source, to be 
admitted against a defendant only because the prosecutor chose 
to seek joinder. 
In a handful of cases, courts have resorted to more imagina-
tive solutions to Bruton severance problems. For example, in 
State v. Johnson, 141 three defendants were charged with capital 
murder. Each confessed, naming the others as accomplices. 
Simultaneous trials were conducted b.efore three different courts 
and juries; each defendant's confession naming the others was 
introduced into evidence. but only in his own trial. 148 In United 
143. [O]nce Runnels had testified that the statement was false, it could hardly 
have profited the respondent for his counsel through cross-examination to try to 
shake that testimony. If the jury were to believe that the statement was false as to 
Runnels, it could hardly conclude that it was not false as to the respondent as well. 
402 U.S. at 629. 
144. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 478 F.2d 1129 (6th Cir. 1973); Murray v. 
State, 628 P.2d 739 (Okla. Crim. App. 1974). See also text at notes 176-98 infra. 
146. The jury instruction not to consider the accusation against the nondeclaring 
defendant may be required by state hearsay rules even though under O'Neil there is no 
confrontation violation. In O'Neil, the Court noted that "Runnels' out-of-court confession 
implicating the respondent was hearsay as to the latter, and therefore inadmissible against 
him under state evidence law. The trial judge so ruled, and instructed the jury that it must 
not consider any part of the statement in deciding whether or not the respondent was 
guilty." 402 U.S. at 626. 
146. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 136 (1968). 
147. 31 Ohio St. 2d 106, 286 N.E.2d 761 (1972). See also State v. Kassow, 28 Ohio 
St. 2d 141,277 N.E.2d 436 (1971), vacated and remanded, 408 U.S. 939 (1972) (companion 
case). 
148. Although the case was in fact severed in Johnson and each defendant was given 
a separate trial, the decision to conduct the trials simultaneously and risk confusing the 
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States v. Sidman, 149 two defendants were jointly tried, but there 
were two juries in the case, one for each defendant. 150 The Bruton 
confession of each was introduced while the jury for the codefen-
dant was outside the courtroom. For each case, the charge of the 
court and the attorneys' jury arguments were presented while the 
other jury was out of the courtroom. 151 
In United States v. Crane, 152 three codefendants were 
charged with bank robbery, and Crane was charged with posses-
sion of the proceeds of that robbery. Crane confessed, naming his 
accomplices. To permit the confession to be used against Crane, 
the trial court divided the trials. The three robbery codefendants 
were tried before a jury, and Crane and his lawyer participated 
in the defense. 153 During that trial, two robbery codefendants 
participants was apparently intended to minimize burdens on witnesses and to eliminate 
the discovery benefits for those defendants not tried first in sequential trials. 
149. 470 F.2d 1158 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1127 (1973). , 
150. Each jury was selected separately. One jury sat in the jury box while the other 
sat in chairs in front of the box. 470 F.2d at 1168. 
151. The jury in one case announced that it had reached a verdict while the other 
jury was still deliberating. The trial court ordered the verdict sealed, and it was not 
revealed until after the second jury announced that it, too, had reached a verdict. Each 
jury found its defendant guilty. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit unenthusiastically endorsed 
the trial court's scheme: 
While we uphold the use of two juries in this case before us, this should not be taken 
as a blanket endorsement by us of such a trial. While it solved part of the Bruton 
problem in Sidman's case, it didn't in the Clifford case. . .• The underlying reason 
for impaneling two juries, although not expounded by the trial court, was undoubt-
edly one of economics, that is, conserving the juries' time and costs, the Court's 
time, and the witnesses' time, costs and convenience. We agree it was more econom-
ical, although the jury fees and expenses would have been the same whether the 
trial was joint or separate. There was a saving as to some of the witnesses' time, 
convenience and expense; and of course the Judge's time was saved since the joint 
trial took four days and separate trials would have taken eight. This was indeed a 
saving. 
470 F.2d at 1170. 
Despite the elaborate precautions against Bruton problems, the conviction of one 
defendant, Clifford, was reversed because while both juries were present, a government 
witness testified that Sidman had told him that he and Clifford had committed the 
robbery. See 470 F.2d at 1170-71. 
152. 499 F.2d 1385 (6th Cir.), cert. de11ied, 419 U.S. 1002 (1974). 
153. The jury would be required to resolve one question that was common to both 
charges - whether a robbery was committed. The dissent noted the problems this caused 
for Crane's attorney: 
[T]he tandem procedure confused the role of appellant's counsel whose client's 
case did not enjoy the fll'St priority on the jury's agenda during the initial phase of 
the trial. He might have been reluctant, for fear of antagonizing the jury that had 
been told to defer consideration of his client's case, to participate forcefully in the 
first phase of the trial, for example, in the examination of witnesses, and in the 
decision whether to make an opening statement or "partial" closing argument. 
499 F.2d at 13~. 
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pleaded guilty, and the third was ac·quitted by the jury. Then 
Crane was tried before the same jury on the possession charge, 
and his confession was introduced into evidence. The confession 
listed those who were to share in the proceeds of the robbery, 
including the wife of the codefendant whom the jury had just 
acquitted. The majority of the Sixth Circuit, in affirming Crane's 
conviction, noted that "[e]ver since Bruton was decided, trial 
judges have struggled to find ways that defendants may be tried 
jointly even though one has given a statement to the police." 15~ 
While it approved of the bifurcated trial in this case, it expressed 
"serious doubts" about its general use to cure Bruton severance 
problems. If, for example, the jury returned a verdict of guilty 
against the defendant being tried first, "there could be a serious 
question whether the same jury .could later give his codefendant 
the dispassionate and unprejudiced hearing required by due pro-
cess and by the sixth amendment."155 The fact that this jury 
acquitted the one defendant whose case was presented to it saved 
Crane from that form of prejudice, but a "trial judge cannot 
predict at the beginning of the trial what the jury's verdict will 
be as to the defendant whose case is first presented."1•6 A vigorous 
dissent suggested that since the jury was asked to decide whether 
a robbery had occurred, a necessary element of the charges 
against all four defendants, it would be unable to reexamine that 
question when it was deliberating in the second phase of the 
trial. 157 Furthermore, the jury in this trial acquitted a defendant 
and moments later heard Crane's confession give strong evidence 
that it had just acquitted a guilty person: "The jury, having been 
told, in effect, that it might have just erred in its earlier verdict, 
may have determined not to permit another 'guilty' person to go 
free."tss 
Even when a trial court clearly violates Bruton by denying 
severance, the prejudiced defendant will not always be able to 
gain reversal on appeal. As we saw above, 159 appellate courts have 
strong policy incentives to uphold lower-court decisions not to 
sever; therefore, they have applied their own doctrines to avoid 
granting severance on Bruton grounds. First, they have relied 
154. 499 F.2d at 1387. 
155. 499 F .2d at 1388. 
156. 499 F.2d at 1388. 
157. See 499 F.2d at 1390. 
158. 499 F.2d at 1390. 
159. See text following note 126 supra. 
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heavily on the doctrine of harmless error to affirm convictions 
obtained in· trials that violated Bruton. In Harrington v. 
California, 160 the Supreme Court held that admitting two confes-
sions of codefendants in a joint trial violated Bruton but the error 
was harmless because the other evidence for conviction was 
"overwhelming."161 In Harrington and two similar successor 
cases, 162 the defendant claiming Bruton error had himself given 
the police an inculpatory statement, which had properly been 
admitted as evidence against him.163 The Supreme Court ap-
peared to attach no special weight to that admission, other than 
to note the defendant's statement as part of the "overwhelming" 
evidence of guilt adduced at trial. 
A defendant's confession has, however, suggested a second 
ground for avoiding Bruton severance to some courts, particularly 
the Second Circuit. To those courts, the rationale underlying 
Bruton does not apply when the defendant has himself given an 
admissible statement that is "substantially identical"164 to the 
codefendant's accusatory statement. This theory, called "inter-
locking confessions," holds that when the defendant has con-
fessed to substantially the same facts as those recited in the 
accusatory parts of a codefendant's confession and when the de-
fendant's confession is properly admitted into evidence, the code-
fendant's accusation does not have the "devastating"165 effect on 
160. 395 U.S. 250 (1969). 
161. "[T]he case against Harrington was so overwhelming that we conclude that this 
violation of Bruton was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt .... " 395 U.S. at 254. 
162. Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427 (1972); Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 
(1973). 
163. Harrington gave a statement admitting that he was present at the time and 
place of the robbery and homicide, but denying that he participated. Although the Su-
preme Court mentioned Harrington's statement, 395 U.S. at 253-54, no detailed descrip-
tion of it appears in the opinion. The opinion below, however, indicates that the statement 
Harrington gave was self-inculpatory. See People v. Bosby, 256 Cal. App. 2d 209, 217, 64 
Cal. Rptr. 159, 164 (1967). Schneble made a detailed confession of the murder with which 
he was charged. Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 430-31 (1972). Brown also made a 
statement which was admitted into evidence against him. Brown v. United States, 411 
U.S. 223, 225 (1973). . 
164. The requirement that the statements be only substantially identical was ex-
plained in United States ex rel. Stanbridge v. Zelker, 514 F.2d 45 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
423 U.S. 872 (1975): 
[S]ince confessions are rarely maternal twins, the court must look to their sub-
stance to see whether they interlock sufficiently on vital points to indicate a com-
mon genesis. If they do, "devastating" effects do not follow from their admission. 
514 F.2d at 48-49. The court then examined the two confessions before it, isolated the 
differences, and, concluding they were insignificant, applied the interlocking confessions 
doctrine to them. 
165. The scope of the Bruton decision has been considered by our court on a num-
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defendant's case that concerned the Supreme Court in Bruton. 
Using this doctrine, the sole inquiry is into whether the defendant 
confessed to substantially the same facts as admitted in the code-
fendant's statement. Thus, the doctrine avoids a detailed exami-
nation of all the other evidence to determine whether the proof 
was "overwhelming" under Harrington. Recently, however, sev-
eral courts have refused to apply the interlocking confession doc-
trine except as part of a search for independent, overwhelming 
evidence of the defendant's guilt.166 · 
In Parker v. Randolph, 167 the Supreme Court considered 
what effect should be given to interlocking confessions in the face 
of a claim of a Bruton violation. The three respondents and two 
others were jointly tried and convicted of murder. None of the 
respondents testified, but the state introduced the oral confession 
of each to the events surrounding the killing. Each confession 
named others who were present, but the confessions were re-
dacted and .the names were replaced by the words "blank" or 
"another person."168 On federal habeas corpus the district court 
and the Sixth Circuit both held that Bruton had been violated 
and that the error was not harmless under Harrington. A plurality 
of four Justices found, in an opinion by Justice Rehnquist, that 
introducing the redacted confessions had not violated the con-
frontation clause.169 Justice Blackmun concurred in the judgment 
but rejected what he saw as an endorsement of the interlocking 
confessions· doctrine. He concurred on the ground that while 
Bruton was. violated, the error was harmless under Harrington. 
her of .occasions, and we have concluded that error of constitutional dimensions 
does not inevitably occur if the questioned confession is admitted under proper 
instructions from the court concerning its limited use and purpose. The likelihood 
of error must be measured against the prejudicial consequences of the failure of the 
jury to follow the court's instructions, i.e., the "devastating" effect of the incrimina• 
tions contained in the codefendant's admissions. . . . Where the confession adds 
nothing to what is otherwise clearly and properly in the case, it can have little 
"devastating" effect. 
514 F.2d at 48 (footnote omitted). 
166. See, e.g., Hodges v. Rose, 570 F.2d 643 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 909 
(1978); State v. Sullivan, 224 Kan. 110, 578 P.2d 1108 (1978). The Second Circuit itself 
has expressed discomfort with the notion of interlocking confessions as an independent 
basis for evaluating Bruton claims. See United States ex rel. Ortiz v. Fritz, 476 F,2d 37 
(2d Cir. 1973). 
167. 99 S.Ct. 2132 (1979). 
168. 99 S.Ct. at 2136 n.3. The Supreme Court acknowledged that the redaction inef-
fectively disguised the identities of the others named. 99 S.Ct. at 2136 n.3. 
169. Justice Rehnquist was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Stewart and 
White. 
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Three Justices dissented on the ground that Bruton had been 
violated and· the Court ought not to reexamine the question of 
harmless error in light of the decisions of the two lower federal 
courts that the error was not harmless. 170 Thus, a majority of the 
Justices could not be assembled either to accept or to reject the 
interlocking confessions doctrine. 
The remarkable feature of this inconclusive decision is the 
effort by Justice Rehnquist to construct an exception to Bruton 
that is broader than the interlocking confession exception recog-
nized by some of the lower courts. Choosing to "cast the issue in 
a slightly broader form"171 than the interlocking confession ques-
tion posed by the State of Tennessee, Justice Rehnquist argued 
that Bruton should be inapplicable whenever the defendant has 
confessed and the confession is admitted into evidence against 
him: "Thus, the incriminating statements of a codefendant will 
seldom, if ever, be of the 'devastating' character referred to in 
Bruton when the incriminated defendant has admitted his own 
guilt."172 If ever adopted, such a test would eliminate the need to 
determine whether the defendant's and codefendant's confessions 
interlock and the issue would simply be whether the defendant 
had confessed to the offense. If he had, Bruton would not be 
violated by admission of the codefendant's statement. 
It is, of course, one matter to contend that a defendant's 
chances for acquittal are not damaged when a codefendant's con-
fession is added to his own confession to substantially the same 
facts. It is quite another, however, to contend that an incriminat-
ing out-of-court statement by a codefendant is not damaging 
whenever the defendant has made any inculpatory statement of 
his own. As Justice Stevens noted in dissent, 173 why should a 
defendant's own confession have such a forfeiting effect and not 
also other highly probative evidence, such as fingerprints or eye-
witness testimony? 
Lower courts justifiably perceive the doctrines of harmless 
error and interlocking confessions as softening the Bruton stan-
dard.174 But where two joined defendants have made confessions 
170. Justice Stevens was joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall. Justice Powell did 
not participate in the decision. 
171. 99 S.Ct. at 2139. 
172. 99 S.Ct. at 2139. 
173. 99 S.Ct. at 2146. 
174. See, e.g., State v. Sullivan, 224 Kan. 110, 113, 578 P.2d 1108, 1113 _(1978) (''The 
Bruton rule has been softened somewhat in later cases."). 
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incriminating each other that cannot be redacted effectively, 
Bruton still requires that neither confession be introduced or that 
each defendant receive a separate trial. Even if an appellate court 
uses one of the Bruton-weakening doctrines to uphold the result 
in a joint trial that admits such confessions, the defendants' con-
frontation rights have still been undermined. Trial courts should 
not accepV75 the recent weakening of Bruton as a repudiation of 
the fundamental rights behind that case. 
B. Antagonistic Defenses 
Joined defendants face the additional risk of antagonistic 
defenses: to defend himself properly, one codefendant may have 
to produce evidence that incriminates another. The latter can 
cross-examine his codefendant on those portions of the testimony 
that incriminate him, 176 but he is forced to defend against two 
accusers, the government and his codefendant. It also places an 
additional burden on the testifying codefendant, who must face 
cross-examinations by both the defendant and the prosecutor. 
The additional burdens on defendant and codefendant grow 
solely from their joinder: in separate trials, each could defend 
unhampered by the impact of his defense on the other. 177 
An increasing number of courts find joint trials of defendants 
with antagonistic defenses unfair. The classic statement of that 
view appears in an Illinois case, People v. Braune: 118 
175. Hod§es v. Rose, 570 F.2d 643 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 909 (i978), ad-
monishes trial judges not to guess about harmless error: 
[A] trial court cannot decide on the admissibility of a statement under Bruton on 
the basis of the strength of the state's case. Rather, the court must decide whether 
the statement incriminates the defendant against whom it is inadmissible in such 
a way as to create a "substantial risk" that the jury will look to the statement in 
deciding on that defendant's guilt. Such an assessment may require consideration 
of other evidence in order to determine whether mere deletion of the defendant's 
name will be effective in making the statement non-incriminatory as to him. But 
consideration of the weight of independent evidence is both improper and unneces-
sary to determination of the Bruton issue at the trial court level. 
570 F.2d at 647 (footnote omitted). 
176. Those cases considering whether a Bruton violation is cured when the declarant 
testifies are discussed in text at notes 139-46 supra. 
177. A defendant intending to testify in his own defense and to incriminate a codefen-
dant would almost certainly claim his privilege against self-incrimination if the govern-
ment attempted to compel his testimony in a separate trial of the codefendant. Even if 
such a defendant were prosecuted and convicted before his codefendant, in most jurisdic-
tions his privilege would remain until the conviction is affirmed on appeal. Only if the 
defendant were tried first and acquitted could his testimony incriminating his former 
codefendant be compelled consistently with the fifth amendment. See text at notes 268-
84 infra. 
178. 363 Ill. 551, 2 N.E.2d 839 (1936). 
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The trial was in many respects more of a contest between the 
defendants than between the People and the defendants. It pro-
duced a spectacle where the People frequently stood by and wit-
nessed a combat in which the 'defendants attempted to destroy 
each other.'79 
Another court has noted "There is no more classic situation of the 
need for a severance than one in which two co-defendants each 
place the blame for a crime on the other."180 But not all courts 
accept that view, as a recent Kentucky case shows: 
A good deal of tripe has grown up around the question of what sort 
of prejudice should entitle a defendant to a separate trial . . . . 
"Prejudiced" means unfairly prejudiced. A defendant is preju-
diced, of course, by being tried at all. . . . [N]either antagonistic 
defenses nor the fact that the defendant incriminates the othe: 
amounts, by itself, to unfair prejudice . . . . That different defen-
dants alleged to have been involved in the same transaction have 
conflicting versions of what took place, or the extent to which they • 
participated in it, vel non, is a reason for rather than against a joint 
trial. If one is lying, it is easier for the truth to be determined if 
all are required to be tried together. 181 
Courts do not agree on what constitutes an "antagonistic 
defense." Courts in the District of Columbia impose what are 
probably the most stringent requirements for severance due to 
antagonistic defenses. In Rhone v. United States, 182 the District 
of Columbia Circuit said: 
Prejudice from joinder of defendants may arise in a wide vari-
ety of circumstances as, for example, . . . where the defendants 
present conflicting and irreconcilable defenses and there is a dan-
ger that the jury will unjustifiably infer that this conflict alone 
demonstrates that both are guilty . . . .183 
179. 363 Ill. at 557, 2 N.E.2d at 842. The Illinois Supreme Court noted in Braune: 
It is our belief that no judge, however learned and skillful, could have protected 
the defendants in this case against their own hostility. The record shows in many 
instances that the defendants' witnesses were subjected to searching and critical 
cross-examinations by counsel for the antagonistic co-defendant. Frequently it ex-
tended beyond the field covered by the State's attorney and in some cases went into 
matters never inquired of by him. 
363 Ill. at 556, 2 N.E.2d at 841. 
180. State v. Singleton, 352 So. 2d 191, 192 (La. 1977). 
181. Ware v. Commonwealth, 537 S.W.2d 174, 176-77 (Ky. 1976) (emphasis in ori-
ginal). Compare the argument that joint trials permit the jury to obtain an "overall view" 
of the events charged. See text at note 55 supra. 
182. 365 F.2d 980 (D.C. Cir. 1966). 
183. 365 F.2d at 981. The court concluded that the mere fact that one defendant 
testified while the other did not is not grounds for severance. For a discussion of this 
situation, see text at notes 212-54 infra. 
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In subsequent cases, the D.C. Circuit has enshrined that state-
ment as its definitive standard. It has refused to find antagonistic 
defenses when one defendant attempted to destroy the credibility 
of a government eyewitness while the other defendant attempted 
to shore up the credibility of that same witness184 and has said 
that the "mere presence of hostility among defendants or the 
desire of one to exculpate himself ·by inculpating another" is in-
sufficient .to show prejudice.185 The Rhone rule is thus designed 
to restrict the need for severance to cases where defenses are 
directly and mutually antagonistic, and thus very likely to be 
prejudicial. 186 
Other courts, purportedly taking less stringent postures than 
Rhone, have nonetheless read the "antagonistic defenses" doc-
trine narrowly. Some have concluded that when one defendant 
denies participation in an offense while another claims entrap-
ment and admits participation, the defenses are not antagonistic, 
even when other testimony links the defendants together. 187 Oth-
ers have held that where defendants did not directly accuse each 
184. United States v. Robinson, 432 F.2d 1348, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1970). An eyewitness 
had identified Robinson, but not Coles, from a photographic array. The court concluded 
that all Robinson had shown was that he and Coles had antagonistic strategies - an 
insufficient showing to compel severance - and cited Rhone for the proper standard by 
which to judge claims of antagonistic defenses. 
185. United States v. Ehrlichman, 546 F.2d 910, 929 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 
429 U.S. 1120 (1977) (quoting from United States v. Barber, 442 F.2d 517, 430 (3d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 846 (1971)). The court concluded that no "irreconcilable inconsis-
tency of defenses" was shown under the Rhone standard. 546 F.2d at 929. 
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has held the Rhone rule governs prose• 
cutions of offenses in the Superior Courts of the District. In Clark v. United States, 367 
A.2d 148 (D.C. App. 1976), Clark and two codefendants were tried for armed robbery. 
Each codefendant testified that he had no prior knowledge of the robbery and that Clark 
committed the offense alone. Clark did not testify. The court avoided deciding whether 
antagoni~tic defenses under Rhone existed but concluded that "even assuming that there 
were antagonistic defenses in this case, appellant has not demonstrated that the conflict 
alone created a danger that in a joint trial the jury would unjustifiably infer his guilt." 
367 A.2d at 160. 
186. There is a danger, for example, that when each defendant testifies and excul-
pates himself while accusing a codefendant, the jury may automatically conclude that 
both are lying when one may be telling the truth. In that circumstance, some courts 
characterize the defenses as being "mutually antagonistic" and reverse the conviction ol' 
each defendant. People v. Braune, 363 Ill. 551, 2 N.E.2d 839 (1936); People v. Markham, 
19 Mich. App. 616, 173 N.W.2d 307 (1969) (convictions not reversed because antagonistic 
nature of defenses not disclosed in motion for severance); Murray v. State, 528 P.2d 739 
(Okla. Crim. App. 1974). 
187. See United States v. Garza, 563 F.2d 1164 (5th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 
1077 (1978); United States v. Morrow, 537 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 
956 (1977). 
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other, the defenses could not be antagonistic. 188 Finally, at least 
one court has refused to find antagonism when one defendant 
discredited part of a witness's testimony, another part of which 
helped a codefendant. The court did not believe that discrediting 
part of a witness's testimony might discredit the witness himself 
and hence prejudice the codefendant. 189 
Under Rhone, defenses must be mutually antagonistic. Sev-
eral courts, however, have extended their concerns over antago-
nistic defenses to reach unilateral accusation. 190 Of those courts, 
some have limited their concerns exclusively to the injury to the 
defendant accused by the testifying codefendant, 191 but others 
have widened their focus to include the injury to the testifying 
codefendant from facing multiple cross-examiners, each with a 
different goal to achieve. 192 
188. In State v. Singleton, 352 So. 2d 191 (La. 1977), two ·defendants were charged 
with knowing possession of a stolen automobile. Each intended to testify that he did not 
know the automobile was stolen because he had been picked up and offered a ride by the 
other. The court concluded that inadequate details were provided in support of the motion 
for severance and alternatively held that the defenses were not really antagonistic: 
Were each defendant claiming that the other knowingly possessed the stolen car, 
then their defenses would have been directly accusatory, making each :'defend not 
only against the state, but also against his co-defendant" and perhaps requiring a 
severance in the interest of justice. . . . Defendants' allegations here, on the other 
hand, would neither place guilt directly on the co-defendant nor relieve the asserter 
of guilt, for each defendant's acknowledged presence in the car would be some 
evidence of guilt of his own possession of the stolen vehicle. 
352 So. 2d at 193. See also State v. Edwards, 197 Neb. 354, 248 N.W.2d 775 (1977). 
189. In State v. Gaxiola, 550 P.2d 1298 {Utah 1976), two defendants were jointly tried 
for murder committed while within a penal institution. Gaxiola's defense was that he 
stabbed the deceased in defense of a fellow inmate whom the deceased was attacking. 'l'he 
codefendant claimed non participation in the killing. The inmate whom Gaxiola contended 
he had been protecting testified under immunity ·and claimed that he had been attacked 
by the deceased, that Gaxiola stabbed the deceased and then withdrew from the scene, 
and that the codefendant then appeared and also stabbed the deceased. By skillful cross-
examination, the codefendant's lawyer discredited the witness's testimony with regard to 
his client's participation in the events. Gaxiola contended that the cross-examination 
placed him and his codefendant in antagonistic positions. The court concluded, however, 
that the "record does not reveal the required opposing hostility in the defenses to support 
severance. The defendants here did not protest innocence while accusing the other." 550 
P.2d at 1301. See also note 184 supra. 
190. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 478 F.2d 1129 {5th Cir_. 1973), in which a 
codefendant testified that he participated in the offense as a police informer and that the 
defendant, who relied upon a defense of mistaken identification, was the culprit. Charac-
terizing the codefendant as the government's "best witness," the court reversed the defen-
dant's conviction while affirming the conviction of the codefendant. 
191. See note 190 supra. See also People v. Davis, 43 Ill. App. 3d 603,357 N.E.2d 96 
(1976). 
192. In State v. Holup, 167 Conn. 240, 355 A.2d 119 (1974), Holup's defense to a 
charge of kidnapping was mistaken identification. Codefendant Gordon's defense was that 
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Some courts rely on procedurai defaults to avoid dealing with 
claims of antagonistic defenses. In addition to requiring a pretrial 
motion for severance, 193 courts have insisted that it show details 
of likely antagonistic defenses. 194 Although the requirement of 
pretrial notice of likely trial unfairness in the form of a motion to 
sever serves a legitimate and necessary function, some courts go 
further, apparently seeking to avoid facing the underlying issues 
on grounds of pro_cedural default. In People v. Markham, 195 for 
example, Markham and Rolston were jointly tried for kidnap-
ping. Rolston claimed he committed the offense under Mark-
ham's coercion, while Markham offered psychiatric testimony 
showing both temporary insanity and a personality disorder that 
made it likely he would follow the leadership of an older male 
figure, such as Rolston. Rolston's counsel cross-examined the psy-
chiatrist, whose testimony was "substantially undercut by the 
codefendant's counsel's extremely able cross-examination."100 
Although Rolston had notified the trial court before trial he would 
· consider the psychiatrist's testimony to be antagonistic to his 
case, neither attorney had made a motion to sever before trial. 107 
The appellate court concluded that "[s]ince the codefendant's 
defenses were inconsistent, and in fact antagonistic, had the trial 
court been fully advised, and had the defendant asserted this 
inconsistency before trial, it might have been an abuse of discre-
tion not to grant separate trials. " 198 
Holup coerced him into participating. Characterizing Gordon as the "most effective wit• 
ness for the state's case," the court reversed Holup's conviction. Later, in State v. Gordon, 
170 Conn. 189,365 A.2d 1056 (1976), Gordon's conviction was reviewed. The court reversed 
Gordon's conviction in part because the joint trial "subjected Gordon to cross-ex-
amination by Holup's counsel." 170 Conn. at 190, 365 A.2d at 1057. 
193. See text at note 124 supra. 
194. State v. Jenkins, 340 So. 2d 157, 166 (La. 1976): "Mere allegations by co• 
defendants that defenses will be antagonistic do not require the trial judge to sever. Co-
defendants seeking severance must present convincing evidence to the trial judge of actual 
antagonism." 
195. 19 Mich. App. 616, 173 N.W.2d 307 (1969). 
196. 19 Mich. App. at 634, 173 N.W.2d at 316. 
197. Before trial, Rolston's attorney had moved for an order permitting him to inter-
view Markham's psychiatrist. In response, Markham's attorney moved for an order pro• 
hibiting Rolston from cross-examining the psychiatrist at trial or, in the alternative, for a 
separate trial. The trial court did not rule on Markham's motions, since it viewed them 
as conditioned upon the granting.ofRolston's motion to interview the psychiatrist, which 
it denied. 19 Mich. App. at 620-21, 173 N.W.2d at 308-09. 
198. 19 Mich. App. at 634-35, 173 N.W.2d at 316. 
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C. Conflicts in Trial Strategy 
Even if their defenses are not overtly antagonistic, joined 
defendants might nevertheless prefer different defense strategies. 
They may, for example, differ over theories of jury selection mu or 
whether to call a particular witness. A joint trial may prevent one 
defendant from using the tactics he prefers, 200 but judicial reluc-
tance to sever has made this an inadequate showing of prejudice 
to prevent joinder.201 Yet the prejudice exists and must be consid-
ered when evaluating the wisdom of joint trials. 
In Merrill u. State,202 for example, the defendant sought sev-
erance in a pretrial motion because he planned to introduce only 
his unsworn statement in his trial defense. Under Georgia law, 
such a strategy would have given him the valuable right to make 
the concluding argument to the jury. His codefendant, however, 
intended to offer evidence, and under Georgia law, if either defen-
dant offered evidence, neither could make the closing argument 
to the jury. Thus, joinder effectively transferred the right to argue 
last from Merrill to the prosecutor. The court gave short shrift to 
the defendant's motion for severance, noting only that the defen-
ses were not antagonistic. 203 Courts have given similar treatment 
to claims that joinder was prejudicial because the law prohibited 
exercising a peremptory challenge unless all defendants agreed to 
199. See notes 45-46 supra and accompanying text. 
200. Such problems do not arise, of course, when one attorney represents all of the 
defendants in a joint trial. However, conflicts of interest in such representation are inevi-
table and multiple representation should be on the decline after Holloway v. Arkansas, 
435 U.S. 475 (1978). 
201. See text at notes 176-98 supra. 
202. 130 Ga. App. 745, 204 S.E.2d 632 (1974). 
203. The court acknowledged that the right to argue last to the jury is an "important 
right" and that denial of that right is ordinarily grounds for reversal. 130 Ga. App. at 749, 
204 S.E.2d at 636. 
Perhaps because the point may not have been argued, the court did not discuss 
whether the nontestifying defendant might retain his right to make the closing argument 
to the jury, while at the same time accommodating the government's desire to rebut the 
arguments of the testifying codefendants. In Raysor v. State, 272 So. 2d 867 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1973), Lester and the brothers Raysor were jointly tried for robbery. Under 
Florida law, a defendant who has presented only his own testimony in defense has the right 
to argue last to the jury. Since the Raysors presented other evidence, while Lester did not, 
the trial court permitted the government to argue last with respect to all three. The court 
of appeals reversed Lester's conviction on the ground that the trial court had unnecessarily 
deprived him of a valuable procedural right. The court suggested that the following order 
of argument would have accommodated the interests of all three defendants and the 
government: (1) Lester opens; (2) State argues all three cases; (3) Raysors argue their 
cases; (4) State argues again with regard to all defendants; (5) Lester presents the conclud-
ing argument. 272 So. 2d at 869. 
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it, 204 or that a defendant was unfairly forced to defend in a joint 
trial where his attorney and his codefendant's attorney had ir-
reconcilable differences. 205 
Special problems arise when one defendant exercises his 
sixth amendment right206 to represent himself. Because such a 
person, even when assisted by standby counsel, is likely to be 
unfamiliar with trial procedures and limitations, he may inad-
vertently prejudice the other defendants. In one such case, 207 
characterized by the appellate court as illustrating that a 
"defendant's right to defend a criminal charge pro se . . . may 
not be an unmixed blessing in a multi-defendant case even when 
assisting counsel is assigned, "208 the court held that the pro se 
defendant's lapses from standard trial procedure,2°0 although 
"unfortunate, "210 did not require reversal of the conviction of a 
204. In State v. Persinger, 62 Wash. 2d 362, 382 P.2d 497 (1963), appeal dismissed, 
376 U.S. 187 (1964), the court rejected a variety of constitutional attacks upon the Wash• 
ington jury-selection procedure, which requires joined defendants to exercise peremptory 
challenges jointly. Since counsel for the joined codefendant would not concur in the 
defendant's desire to exercise their sixth and final peremptory challenge on a particular 
member of the panel, and since the trial court refused defendant's motion that he be 
permitted to exercise the challenge individually, the challenge was lost. A similar attack 
upon a similar procedure was turned aside in Martin v. State, 262 Ind. 232, 317 N.E.2d 
430 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 911 (1975). The court did recognize, however, that each 
defendant should have the right to show that the requirement of joint exercise of peremp-
tory challenges would be prejudicial in his particular case and, upon such a showing, that 
the trial court should apportion the challenges among the defendants for individual exer-
cise. 
205. People v. Brown, 27 Ill. App. 3d 569, 327 N.E.2d 51 (1975). A few of the differ-
ences: the defendant's counsel wished to try the case on the single point of identity while 
the codefendant's counsel planned multiple defenses; the attorneys could not agree on a 
single approach to jury selection; the codefendant's lawyer cross-examined the defen-
dant's alibi witnesses, but only on collateral points; during closing arguments, the defen-
dant's lawyer characterized the evidence against the codefendant as overwhelming, while 
the codefendant's lawyer disputed this and discussed the strength of the government's 
case against the defendant. The defendant claimed further that there was "personal 
antagonism" between the attorneys. The appellate court refused to overturn the trial 
court's denial of severance, since the defenses (alibi and mistaken identification) were not 
inconsistent. 27 Ill. App. 3d at 574, 327 N.E.2d at 54. 
206. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). 
207. United States v. Sacco, 563 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1039 
(1978). 
208. 563 F.2d at 555. 
209. In his opening statement, Sacco said that a codefendant intended to testify and 
briefly outlined the nature of that testimony, but the codefendant changed his mind and 
did not testify. See 563 F .2d at 555. Similarly, Sacco commented in his jury argument on 
matters not in evidence. See 563 F.2d at 556. 
210. 563 F.2d at 555. The court concluded, "Nor do we agree that Sacco's conduct of 
his defense was so inept or comments he made in summation so prejudicial as to deprive 
Gentile of a fair trial." 563 F.2d at 555 (footnote omitted). 
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codefendant. Nevertheless, the court prescribed steps to be taken 
by trial courts in the future to minimize the prejudicial effect of 
pro se representation on codefendants. 211 
Joinder may also distort one of the most important compo-
nents of trial strategy: a defendant's decision whether to testify. 212 
The correctness of that decision may determine acquittal or con-
viction. Although it is widely assumed that not testifying places 
additional burdens upon the defense, 213 testifying is not always 
the best course of action. The defendant's demeanor, the credibil-
ity of his testimony, or the revelation of prior convictions may 
transform him into the government's best witness and ensure 
conviction in what would otherwise be a doubtful case.214 
Moreover, the defendant's decision whether to testify will 
211. In addition to the steps taken by the trial court in this case (assigning standby 
counsel to advise the pro se defendant, holding the pro se defendant to the rules of trial 
procedure, cautioning him to '!refrain from speaking in the first person as though he were 
testifying, or voicing personal observations in his comments on the evidence," cautioning 
the jury when he strayed beyond those bounds, and informing the jury that nothing said 
by the lawyers was evidence in the case), the court suggested the following: 
[T)o avoid any ambiguity in the jury's mind about the unsworn statements of a 
pro se defendant, it should be made clear to the jury at the outset that anything 
he says in his "lawyer" role is not evidence against him or a co-defendant, and his 
remarks are to be regarded no differently than those of the attorneys in the case. 
The pro se defendant should also be specifically instructed beforehand that in any 
opening statement or summation he must avoid reference to co-defendants without 
prior permission from the court, and should refrain from commenting upon matters 
not in evidence or solely within his personal knowledge or belief. 
563 F.2d at 556-57 (footnote omitted). 
212. As between counsel and the accused, the decision whether to testify is made by 
the accused. ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO 
THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION§ 5.2(a) (Approved Draft, 1971): 
Certain decisions relating to the conduct of the case are ultimately for the accused 
and others are ultimately for defense counsel. The decisions which are to be made 
by the accused after full consultation with counsel are: (i) what plea to enter; (ii) · 
whether to waive jury trial; (iii) whether to testifyin his own behalf. 
Standard 5.2(b) states that other decisions "on what witnesses to call, whether and how 
to conduct cross-examination, what jurors to accept or strike, what trial motions should 
be made, and all other strategic and tactical decisions are the exclusive province of the 
lawyer after consultation with his client." 
213. A. AMSTERDAM, B. SEGAL & M. MILLER, supra note 26, at 1-386: "It is widely 
agreed among criminal lawyers of experience that the defendant's failure to take the stand 
will be construed by the fact finder as an indication that the defendant is hiding something 
- hence that he has something to hide." 
214. Id. at 1-385: 
Obviously, the weaker the prosecution's case, the more difficult is the choice 
[whether to put the accused on the stand), since defense testimony may supply 
deficiencies in the prosecution's evidence and bolster unconvincing aspects. . .. 
[T)he only broad principle that is of much use is that generally no defense is better 
than a bad defense - from the point of view both of verdict and of sentence. 
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dictate other defensive strategy in a case. Important trial tactics 
- jury selection, the opening statement, other defense evidence, 
and counsel's argument to the jury - depend to. a large extent 
upon whether the defendant testifies.215 Pretrial matters, such as 
what pretrial motions to file, 216 and even defense investigation of 
the case, 217 also depend greatly upon whether the defendant plans 
to take the stand. 
Joinder complicates each defendant's decision. Ideally, 
joined defendants·should all make the same decision, thus mini-
mizing the danger of inconsistent defenses and widening the 
scope of cooperation in pretrial motions, jury selection, opening 
statements, other defensive evidence, and jury argument. There 
is, therefore, great pressure on the defense to make an "all or 
none" decision about testifying in a joint trial. Often, however, 
defendants in a joint trial must go their separate ways on this 
pivotal question; when they do, some prejudice is almost inevita-
ble. The diverging strategies may compound other joint trial 
harms, for example when the testifying defendant intends to in-
criminate the nontestifying defendant218 or when the nontestify-
ing defendant would testify for the testifying defendant in a sepa-
rate trial.219 In this Section, however, I will limit my analysis to 
prejudice beyond the harms discussed elsewhere in this Article. 
In Griffin v. California, 220 the Supreme Court held that the 
fifth and fourteenth amendments prohibit "either comment by 
the prosecution on the accused's silence or instructions by the 
court that such silence is evidence of guilt."221 Comment on a 
defendant's assertion of his privilege against self-incrimination 
by not testifying "is a penalty . . . for exercising a constitutional 
privilege" which "cuts down on the privilege by making its asser-
215. Id.: "All cross-examination of prosecution witnesses and any opening statement 
that defense counsel may have made at the beginning of the case were, of course, designed 
to harmonize with the defensive case he has been planning to present." 
216. For example, if the defense counsel expects his client to testify, he may wish to 
litigate the admissibility of his client's criminal record for impeachment purposes in 
advance of trial: Of course, the outcome of such a pretrial motion may have much to do 
with whether his client will actually testify. 
217. If the accused will testify to an alibi, the defense counsel must direct an immedi-
ate investigation, before witnesses disappear and memories fade, in order to secure evi-
dence that will corroborate the defendant's testimony. 
218. See text at notes 176-98 supra for a discussion of antagonistic defenses between 
joined codefendants. 
219. See text at notes 268-84 infra for a discussion of severance to enable one defen-
dant to testify for another. 
220. 380 U.S. 609 (1965). 
221. 380 U.S. at 615 (footnote omitted). 
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tion costly."222 In response to the argument that the jury will in 
any event draw an unfavorable inference from the defendant's 
failure to testify, the Court stated, "What the jury may infer, 
given no help from the court, is one thing. What it may infer when 
the court solemnizes the silence of the accused into evidence 
against him is quite another. "223 
The unfavorable inference the jury is likely to draw from a 
defendant's silence is a significant defensive problem even in an 
individual trial. But when silence is contrasted with testimony by 
a codefendant in a joint trial, the jury is more likely to draw that 
unfavorable inference and rely on it in reaching a verdict. By 
instructing the jury that it may draw no inference from the failure 
of one defendant to testify224 and by instructing the jury on how 
to evaluate the codefendant's testimony, 225 the trial court only 
highlights the contrast. 226 Despite the silent defendant's efforts to 
characterize the trial as solely a test of the government's proof,22; 
the testimony of the codefendant is dramatic evidence to the jury 
that at least one party thought the government's case worthy of 
response. Why, then, did not the silent defendant offer a defense, 
unless he had none to offer? When a jury compares the strategies 
in that manner, has not an additional penalty been exacted from 
the silent defendant "for exercising a constitutional privilege"228 
because of the fortuity of being jointly tried with a codefendant 
who elected to testify? 
That burden for the silent defendant often accompanies a 
correlative benefit for the testifying codefendant. As long as the 
testifying codefel)dant refrains from accusing the silent defendant 
of responsibility for the offense, that defendant is unlikely to 
cross-examine him. 229 The jury sees him take the witness stand 
222. 380 U.S. at 614. 
223. 380 u.s·. at 614. 
224. Such an instruction may be given over the defendant's objection. Lakeside v. 
Oregon, 435· U.S. 333 (1978). 
225. See, e.g., the instruction given by the trial court in De Luna v. United States, 
308 F.2d 140, 143 (5th Cir. 1962). 
226. The charge prohibiting the jury from drawing an adverse inference from the 
defendant's failure to testify has been described as "a little like trying to hide an elephant 
under a handkerchief." A. AMSTERDAM, B. SEGAL & M. MILLER, supra note 26, at 1-386. 
227. See generally id. at 1-339. 
228. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965). 
229. Some courts take the position that a defendant's right to cross-examine a co-
defendant or a codefendant's witnesses exists only to the extent the direct testimony 
incriminates the defendant. See, e.g., United States v. Mercks, 304 F.2d 771, 772 (4th Cir. 
1962); Eder v. People, 179 Colo. 122, 125, 498 P.2d 945, 946-47 (1974). 
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and subject himself to cross-examination by the prosecution, in 
stark relief against the defendant who elects to hold his peace. In 
closing argument, the attorney for the testifying codefendant will 
doubtless underscore the courage and candor of his client in tak-
ing the witness stand and enduring a rigorous cross-examination 
by the government. 230 
Counsel for the testifying codefendant would like to go fur-
ther in that line of argument: he would rather allude specifically 
to the defendant's failure to testify, contrasting it with his client's 
action. Sometimes, he would even like to argue that his client has 
demonstrated his innocence by testifying, while the defendant 
has demonstrated his guilt by keeping silent. Do the principles 
of Griffin prohibit him from doing so? 
The _leading case discussing this problem is De Luna v. 
United States. 231 De Luna and Gomez were jointly tried for fed-
eral narcotics offenses. Gomez took the stand and testified that 
he was an innocent victim of circumstanc.e and that de Luna was 
totally responsible.232 De Luna did not testify, but his attorney 
contended in jury argument that he was being made a scapegoat 
and recalled that police witnesses had not corroborated Gomez's 
version of the facts. In his jury argument, Gomez's lawyer de-
claimed: "Well, at least one man was honest enough and had 
courage enough to take the stand and subject himself to cross 
examination, and tell you the whole story . ... You haven't 
heard a word from this man [de Luna]."233 De Luna's objections 
to this argument were overruled. The trial court instructed the 
jury that it could draw no adverse inference from de Luna's fail-
ure to testify234 and also instructed the jury about how to evaluate 
230. See, e.g., United States v. Shuford, 454 F.2d 772, 779 (4th Cir. 1971) ("Mr. 
Shuford answered questions in a direct, forthright manner without evasion"). 
231. 308 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1962). 
232. He testified that when he and de Luna were riding in Gomez's car, de Luna saw 
the police and tossed him a package, telling him to throw it to the ground. Gomez did so, 
and when the police recovered the package, it was found to contain narcotics. 
233. 308 F.2d at 142 n.1 (emphasis supplied by the court). Before this comment, 
Gomez's lawyer argued that "We know a little something about Adolfo Gomez. We knew 
that for fifteen or twenty years, more or less, he has worked day after day at hard labor. I 
don't know what this man does for a living. He could have gotten up and told you . ••• " 
308 F.2d at 142 n.1 (emphasis supplied by the court). The trial court overruled de Luna's 
objection. Gomez's lawyer then argued, "Now, further, Adolfo Gomez has given you his 
version of the facts in this case. He has told you how the narcotics came into his posses-
sion .... I haven't heard anyone deny that." 308 F.2d at 142 n.1 (emphasis supplied by 
the court). Again, an objection was overruled: 
234. The court charged the jury: 
The defendant Carlos Garza De Luna has not testified in this case. You 
are instructed that under the law a defendant in a criminal case may take the stand 
June 1979) Joint Trials 1433 
the testimony of Gomez. 235 Gomez was acquitted and de Luna 
convicted. The Fifth Circuit reversed de Luna's conviction be-
cause of the comments of Gomez's attorney on de Luna's failure 
to testify. 
Although Judge Bell, concurring specially, believed reversal 
was required because the trial court had not sustained de Luna's 
objection to the argument and had failed to instruct the jury to 
disregard the comments of Gomez's attorney, .the majority went 
much further in its analysis. Judge Wisdom, writing for the ma-
jority, held that a codefendant's allusion to a defendant's failure 
to testify infringes fifth amendment rights as much as if the com-
ment comes from the prosecutor or the trial court. But, the major-
ity noted, counsel for the testifying codefendant may have a duty 
to comment on the failure of a joined defendant to testify that 
conflicts with the fifth amendment rights of the silent defendant: 
These were. not casual or isolated references; they were integral to 
Gomez's defense. And considering the case from Gomez's point of 
view, his attorneys should be free to draw all rational inferences 
from the failure of a codefendant to testify, just as an attorney is 
free to comment on the effect of any interested party's failure to 
produce material evidence in his possession or to call witnesses 
who have knowledge of pertinent facts. Gomez has rights as well 
as de Luna, and they should be no less than if he were prosecuted 
singly. His right to confrontation allows him to invoke every infer-
ence from de Luna's absence from the stand. 236 
With that understanding of the rights of the parties, the majority 
and testify in his own behalf if he chooses, but the defendant is not required to 
testify, and you are charged that the failure of the defendant to take the stand in · 
;> his own behalf in this case will not be considered by you as any evidence at all of 
his guilt as to the charge contained in the indictment in this case, and in your 
retirement you will not consider or refer to the fact that the defendant did not 
testify. 
308 F.2d at 143 n.2. 
235. The court charged the jury: 
The defendant Adolfo 0. Gomez has taken the stand and testified in his own 
behalf in this case. A defendant cannot, in a criminal case, be compelled to take 
the witness stand and to testify. Whether he testifies or does not testify is a matter 
of his own choosing. 
When, however, a defendant elects to take the witness stand and testify, then 
you have no right to disregard his testimony because he is accused of a crime. When 
a defendant does testify, he at once becomes the same as any other witness, and 
his credibility is to be tested by and subjected to the same tests as are legally 
applied to any other witness. <J 
308 F.2d at 143. 
236. 308 F.2d at 143. 
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saw only one clear remedy: "If an attorney's duty to his client 
should require him to draw the jury's attention to the possible 
inference of guilt from a codefendant's silence, the trial judge's 
duty is to order that the defendants be tried separately. " 237 
Severance does indeed resolve the conflict in duties. Al-
though a def end ant has a fifth amendment right not to be called 
to give testimony in his own trial, 238 a witness has only a right not 
to be compelled to answer incriminating questions. 239 Thus, after 
severance, counsel for a defendant could call the former codefen-
dant to the witness stand and require him to claim his privilege 
against self-incrimination question by question, for a line of ques-
tions, or at least once for all questions, in the presence of the jury. 
In argument, counsel could then effectively contrast the witness's 
silence with the courage and candor of his testifying client with-
out injuring the silent former codefendant. 240 
Severance to avoid the De Luna dilemma fosters two objec-
tions: first, that such severance might force a witness to invoke 
the fifth amendment before a jury, and second, that such sever-
ance might disrupt the criminal justice system. Each objection is 
groundless. Some courts hold that a party may not call a witness 
whom it knows will claim his fifth amendment right and require 
him to make the claim in the presence of the jury. 241 If it is es tab-
237. 308 F.2d at 141. 
238. See V. BALL, R. BARNHART, K. BROWN, G. Dix, E. GELHORN, R. MEISENHOLDER, 
E. ROBERTS, & J. STRONG, McCORMICK'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE§ 130, at 272 
(2d ed. E. McCleary 1972) [hereinafter cited as McCORMICK]: 
Basically, the right of an accused is the right not only to avoid giving incrimi-
nating responses to inquiries put to him but also to be free from the inquiries 
themselves. Thus the privilege of an accused allows him not only to refuse to 
0 
respond to questions directed at his alleged participation in the offense but also 
entitles him not even to be called as a witness at his own trial. 
239. Id. § 136. 
240. See, e.g., United States v. Bautf~ta, 509 F.2d 675, 678 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 
421 U.S. 976 (1975): 
Taylor, who was in this case in the role of a witness as distinguished from a defen-
dant, could not refuse to take the stand and be examined. His privilege would have 
arisen only when the answer to some question asked would have tended to incrimi-
nate him, and it would have been for the court to say whether silence was justified. 
(Footnotes omitted.) 
241. See, e.g., Bowles v. United States, 439 F.2d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 
415 U.S. 995 (1971); United States v. Marquez, 319 F. Supp. 1016, 1019 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 
1970), affd., 449 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1971); State v. Morales, 138 N.J. Super. 225, 229, 350 
A.2d 492, 495 (App. Div. 1975); Rodriguez v. State, 513 S.W.2d 594,596 (Tex. Crim. App. 
1974). ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE 
PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION § 7 .6(c) (Supp. 1971) provides: "A law-
yer should not call a witness who he knows will claim a valid privilege not to testify, for 
the purpose of impressing upon the jury the fact of the claim of privilege. In some in-
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lished outside the presence of the jury that the witness intends 
to invoke his fifth amendment right in response to all or substan-
tially all of the questions that could be asked - which would 
surely be true of a former codefendant not yet tried - trial courts 
in those jurisdictions would not permit the witness to be called. 
Nor would they instruct the jury that the witness claimed the 
fifth amendment or give a missing witness instruction. 242 They 
usually justify their refusals on the grounds .that the witness's 
claim would not assist the defendanes case or·that the jury might 
attach too much importance to the claim because of the high 
courtroom drama surrounding it. 243 
The doctrinal soundness of such decisions is doubtful. They 
prohibit defensive tactics that suggest rational inferences to the 
jury, do not infringe upon the witness's privilege against self-
incrimination, and are arguably protected by the defendant's 
right to have compulsory process and to present evidence in his 
defense. Unless the testifying defendant can require the former 
codefendant to claim his fifth amendment right in front of the 
jury in a severed trial, he gained nothing by severing the cases. 
Indeed, the testifying defendant lost the natural contrast between 
his testimony and the silence of the codefendant, and, on that 
score, is worse off after severance than before. 
The second objection to the De Luna solution - disruption 
of the judicial dockets - was succinctly expressed by Judge Bell: 
[S]everance in advance of trial may be required where there is a 
representation to the court that one co-defendant does not expect 
to take the stand while another or others do expect to testify, and 
claim their right to comment upon the failure of the other to tes-
tify. This would eliminate joint trials, or vest in a defendant the 
right to a mistrial during final arguments, or in the alternative 
create b.uilt-in reversible error, all in the discretion of the defen-
dants.244 
But Judge Bell's nightmare has not come to pass. Later cases 
have quite uniformly limited De Luna to circumstances in which 
the defenses of the testifying and ·nontestifying defendants are 
antagonistic.245 As the Fifth Circuit itself explained in Gurleski v. 
stances, as defined in the Code of Professional Responsibility, doing so will constitute 
unprofessional conduct." See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(a) 
(8) & DR 7-106(c)(7). 
242. See Bowles v. United States, 439 F.2d 536, 542 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 
415 U.S. 995 (1971). 
243. See cases cited in note 241 supra. 
244. 308 F.2d 140, 156 (5th Cir. 1962). 
245. See, e.g., United States v. De La Cruz Bellinger, 422 F.2d 723, 726-27 (9th Cir.), 
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United States: 246 "The De Luna rule applies only when it is coun-
sel's duty to make a comment, and a mere desire to do so will not 
support an incursion on a defendant's carefully protected right to 
-· silence. Clearly, a duty arises only when the arguments of the co-
defendants are antagonistic."247 And yet Gurleski's argument 
seems strained. Although comment upon silence is more potent 
when the testifying defendant has accused the silent defendant 
of responsibility. .for the offense, De Luna, if it is correct at all, 
should not be limited to such a situation. The silence of a co-
defendant compares unfavorably with the testimony of a defen-
dant in any case, whether the defenses are antagonistic or not. 
Other courts have narrowed De Luna by limiting what is consid-
ered a comment upon silence. Much as courts require that, to be 
error, prosecutorial comment upon silence refer only to the defen-
dant's silence,248 courts have countenanced arguments by counsel 
for testifying codefendants that discuss the courage and candor 
of their clients in taking the witness stand, 249 as long as they 
refrain from comparing that courage and candor directly with the 
supposed cowardice and evasiveness of the defendant who re-
mained silent. They have even held direct comparisons cured 
when the trial court sustained an objection and instructed the 
jury to disregard the argument.250 If courts continue to eviscerate 
De Luna, we may never know if Judge Bell's fears for the judicial 
system were justified. 
Even apart from the penalty exacted for remaining silent 
when a codefendant has testified, the credibility of the codefen-
dant's testimony may vitally affect the silent defendant. If the 
codefendant testifies to a defense that includes the silent defen-
dant, such as a joint alibi, then the silent defendant may actually 
benefit from a joint trial. If the evidence is credible, the silent 
defendant shares its benefit without running the risks of testify-
ing and being cross-examined. On the other hand, if the jury 
disbelieves the codefendant's testimony, it is likely to include the 
silent defendant within its disbelief and anger. The rights of the 
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 942 (1970); United States v. Battaglia, 394 F.2d 304,317 (7th Cir. 
1968); Kolod v. United States, 371 F.2d 983 (10th Cir. 1967); Hayes v. United States, 329 
F.2d 209, 221-22 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 980 (1964). The majority position in De 
Luna was flatly rejected in United States v. McKinney, 379 F.2d 259, 265 (6th Cir. 1967), 
246. 405 F.2d 253 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977, 981 (1969). 
247. 405 F.2d at 265 (emphasis original). 
248. See McCORMICK, supra note 238, § 131. 
249. See, e.g., United States v. Shuford, 454 F.2d 772, 779 (4th Cir. 1971). 
250. See, e.g., United States v. Alpern, 564 F.2d 755, 761-62 (7th Cir. 1977). 
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testifying codefendant sharply circumscribe any efforts by the 
silent defendant to disavow his' codefendant's testimony. Thus, 
the fate of the silent defendant often hinges upon the nature and 
quality of his codefendant's testimony, an aspect of the trial al-
most totally beyond his control. 
1n~ United States u. Gambrill, 251 two defendants were jointly 
tried for rape. One defendant elected not to testify, but the other 
offered testimony that he and the silent defendant were together 
elsewhere at the time of the offense. The silent:-defendant, believ-
ing that the alibi testimony lacked credibility and damaged his 
case, wished to disavow it. Since the testimony was superficially 
beneficial to him, the silent defendant could not cross-examine 
the codefendant or his witness to impeach them. At the defen-
dant's request, the trial court instructed the jury at the time the 
testimony was offered and in its general charge that the alibi 
testimony was being offered only on behalf of the testifying co-
defendant. 252 On appeal from conviction, the D.C. Circuit ordered 
severance on the ground that the trial court's instructions had 
informed the jury that the silent defendant did not believe the 
alibi testimony. Because this message was delivered without 
sworn testimony from the silent defendant that would be subject 
to cross-examination, the testifying defendant was deprived of his 
right to confront witnesses. It would have been permissible, the 
court believed, for the silent defendant to have taken the stand 
and testified that the alibi evidence was false, but he could not 
use the court's instructions to do so. The appellate court also 
rejected suggestions that the trial court's procedure would have 
been proper if it had included an instruction to the jury not to 
draw inferences of falsity from the limiting instruction or if it had 
instructed the alibi witnesses to delete all references to the silent 
def~ndant in t_h_t:ir t~stimony. 253 
The problems posed by Gambrill can only be solved by sepa-
rate trials. The testifying codefendant's case was damaged by the 
instruction that the alibi evidence, although including the silent 
defendant, was offered only on behalf of the testifying codefen-
dant. The silent defendant may well have been damaged by alibi 
testimony of dubious truthfulness, testimony that increased 
251. 449 F.2d 1148 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
252. In its charge, the trial court said, "At the outset I will repeat what I said earlier 
at the request of Mr. Gambrill's counsel. That is, that the witnesses called by Mr. 
Hunter's attorney are offered on behalf of Mr. Hunter, only." 449 F.2d at 1161 n.50. 
253. See 449 F.2d at 1163 n.60. 
D 
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rather than decreased the likelihood of a guilty verdict against 
both. 254 Yet even under Gambrill, a defendant cannot remain 
silent and combat his gratuitous inclusion in the injurious alibi 
of another. 
Whenever one defendant chooses to testify while another 
chooses to remain silent, any adverse inference the jury naturally 
draws from silence is heightened by the contrast between the 
divergent defense strategies. Some courts may believe that con-
flicts in defense strategy are inevitable in any multi-defendant 
case.255 For the discerning jurist, however, severance is the ob-
vious and easy solution. 
D. Codefendant Would Testify for Defendant in a Separate 
Trial 
Joint trials can sometimes produce a converse of antagonistic 
defenses that is even more troubling: a codefendant may be will-
ing to testify on behalf of a defendant but refuse to do so in a 
joint trial because his testimony may adversely affect his own 
defense. In this situation, joinder can preclude a defendant from 
presenting testimony that may be crucial to his defense. Some 
courts have recognized obtaining the beneficial testimony of a 
codefendant as among the most compelling reasons for granting 
254. Even when a codefendant presents an alibi that does not include the defendant 
within its exculpatory intent, the quality of the codefendant's defense may affect the 
defendant. For example, in United States v. De Larosa, 450 F.2d 1057 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. 
denied, 405 U.S. 927, 405 U.S. 957 (1972), the alibi witnesses of the codefendant were 
hostile while testifying and all had criminal records, one for perjury, which were intro• 
duced into evidence. During the same trial, codefendant Jones, while testifying in his own 
defense, stated that he had first met codefendant Noel in prison. Noel had declined to 
testify in order to keep his criminal record from the jury. The appellate court found that 
the trial court's instruction to disregard the reference to Noel's imprisonment was sufl1-
cient to cure the prejudice. 450 F.2d at 1062-63. 
255. In State v. Fitzpatrick, _ Mont. -, 569 P.2d 383 (1977), each of four 
defendants claimed that joinder denied effective assistance of counsel on the following 
grounds: · 
(1) The number of defendants and independent counsel made it impossible to 
employ effective trial tactics; (2) one defendant or another disqualified a district 
judge or challenged a juror that another defendant would have allowed to remain 
in the case; (3) certain counsel delved into areas on cross-examination that merely 
repeated the state's case against particular defendants; and (4) all defendants, with 
the exception of Radi, elected to rest their cases following the state's case-in-chief, 
thus compelling Radi to rest. 
__ Mont.at_, 569 P.2d at 393. The court responded to these olaims by stating that 
they "could be raised in almost any multiple defendant-counsel proceeding. It would be 
most unusual, in our opinion, if four defense counsel representing individual clients did 
agree on every question of trial tactics." _ Mont. at-, 569 P.2d at 393, 
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a severance, 256 but other courts have adopted an extremely 
cynical position, apparently viewing this ground of severance as 
an "alibi-swapping device."257 
It is not surprising that some courts take a cynical attitude. 
Severance to obtain a codefendant's testimony will work only in 
limited circumstances. Moreover, it presents the court with a 
number of difficult problems, beautifully illustrated in the recent 
case of United States v. Gay. 258 Dixon, Harris and Gay were in-
dicted for conspiracy to possess heroin with intent to distribute 
it and for possession and distribution of heroin. Dixon sought 
severance, asserting that if the cases were severed, Harris would 
testify that Dixon "was not involved in the narcotic transac-
tion. "259 Harris confirmed this and asked to be tried first to fore-
stall the admission of his testimony for Dixon at his own trial. 
The trial court thought the defendants were "playing games"260 
and offered to sever the cases only on the following conditions: 
that Dixon be tried first and that Harris waive his privilege 
against self-incrimination at each trial so that if he did not testify 
for Dixon the government could call him at Dixon's. trial and so 
that in any event the government could call him at his own 
trial.261 Not surprisingly, Harris rejected that offer, and the trial 
court denied the motion for severance. The following colloquy 
ensued: 
MR. SHERMAN [Counsel for Dixon]: Your Honor, may I just 
inquire of the Court as to why, if there is a severance, why would 
it be necessary for Mr. Harris to have to incriminate himself at his 
own trial if he wishes to testify on behalf of the codefendant? 
THE COURT: Counsel, I am not going to answer any questions for 
you.2e2 
After joint trial, all three defendants were convicted and the 
256. See, e.g., United States v. Shuford, 454 F.2d 772, 777 (4th Cir. 1971); Byrd v. 
Wainwright, 428 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Echeles, 352 F.2d 892, 897 
(7th Cir. 1965). 
257. State v. Talavera, 243 So. 2d 595,597 (Fla. 1971) (judgment vacated on federal 
habeas corpus for failure to provide the defendant an opportunity to show the trial court 
constitutional grounds for severance; habeas writ upheld in Talavera v. Wainwright, 468 
F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1972)). Other courts have expressed great skepticism about the verac-
ity of proffered testimony. See United States v. Rosa, 560 F.2d 149 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 
434 U.S. 862 (1977) (suspicions aroused by timing of the motion for severance and familial 
relationship of codefendant to defendant). 
258. 567 F.2d 916 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 999 (1978). 
259. 567 F.2d at 917 n.1. 
260. 567 F.2d at 923. 
261. See 567 F.2d at 917, 922. 
262. 567 F.2d at 923. 
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convictions were affirmed by the Ninth Circuit. The appellate 
court characterized Harris's offer to testify for Dixon if he were 
tried first as conditional263 and held that the trial court was within 
the bounds of discretion in denying it on that ground. The appel-
late court doubted whether Harris could be forced to waive his 
privilege against ·self-incrimination as a price of severance, 20~ but 
it did not doubt the propriety of the trial court's ruling that 
Dixon, not Harris, would be tried first. Although it would appear 
that the trial court's insistence that Dixon be tried first was in-
tended to preclude Harris from testifying,265 the appellate court 
held that the trial court's action was in fact designed to ensure 
that "the separate trials would be scheduled and conducted 
under the same rules and with the same consequences as if the 
defendants had been separately indicted."266 
Gay reveals the many considerations that a trial court must 
bear in mind when faced with a motion for severance to obtain a 
codefendant's testimony. First, no matter how critical the testi-
mony, a defendant cannot violate a codefendant's privilege 
against self-incrimination.267 He may not compel a codefendant 
to testify in a joint trial;268 he may not even call the codefendant 
as a witness and force him to plead the fifth amendment before 
the jury.269 A defendant may not comment upon a codefendant's 
failure to take the stand in a joint trial. 270 As long as they are 
263. 567 F.2d at 917. The offer to testify for Dixon was, of course, conditioned upon 
Harris being tried first. Presumably, -all such offers to testify are so conditioned because 
if the codefendant were willing to testify for another before his own case was tried, that 
would be tantamount to testifying in his own trial. The court's action in disqualifying the 
motion for severance on the ground that the offer to testify was conditional was based upon 
United States v. Rice, 550 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 954 (1977). Rice is, 
however, distinguishable in that the Fifth Circuit in that case interpreted the offer to 
testify to mean that "[w]hatever the testimony, it was contingent upon Alvarez not being 
required to testify to anything which might tend to incriminate him." 550 F.2d at 1370. 
Such an offer is much more limited than one which merely seeks to have the offerer tried 
first. 
264. See 567 F.2d at 917-18 n.2. 
265. There is, for example, no indication that the attorney for the government had 
any legitimate preference about who should be tried first if a severance were granted to 
enable Dixon to obtain the testimony of Harris. 
266. 567 F.2d at 920. 
267. See generally McCORMICK, supra note 238, § 141. 
268. McCORMICK, supra note 238, § 130. 
269. See, e.g., Coleman v. United States, 420 F.2d 616 (D.C. Cir. 1969); United States 
v. Carella, 411 F.2d 729 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 860 (1969). 
270. Although such a prohibition would seem compelled by the principle of Griffin 
v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), the question is somewhat clouded by De Luna v. United 
States, 308 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1962). De Luna is discussed in text at notes 231-50 supra. 
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joined for trial, the codefendant alone decides whether he will 
testify. Of course, he will rarely testify in a joint trial if testifying 
harms his own interests - altruism does not typify the behavior 
of criminal defendants. And there are many good reasons not to 
testify. Truthful testimony might assure conviction. Even if the 
testimony would help his cause, a codefendant might prefer that 
the jury not learn of his criminal record. He might simply be too 
nervous or inarticulate to make a good witness. 271 Thus, joinder 
often guarantees that a defendant will not be able to use a code-
fendant's testimony in fashioning his defense. 
Second, the codefendant with helpful testimony must be 
tried first if severance is to offer any improvement. 272 Otherwise, 
his testimony could be used against him, even if he does not 
testify at his own trial, 273 and he would be just as unwilling to help 
his comrade as if the cases were still joined.274 Even after being 
tried first, a codefendant may feel uncomfortable testifying, per-
haps because he fears additional charges or because he hopes for 
a new trial. If his concerns are realistic, ,his privilege against self-
incrimination still protects him; he may decide to waive whatever 
remains of his privilege, 275 but he may renege on his earlier offer 
271. See A. AMSTERDAM, B. SEGAL & M. MILLER, supra note 26, at 1-386 to -392 for a 
brief discussion of the considerations that should inform the decision whether to put a 
defendant on the witness stand. 
272. See 567 F.2d at 920. 
273. McCORMICK, supra note 238, § 132. 
274. Some courts, in affirming denials of severance, express doubt about whether 
severance would have been efficacious, in view of the uncertainty about whether the 
codefendant would be tried first, ignoring the obvious truth that the same considerations 
that require severance also reqiiire an order that the codefendant be tried first. See, e.g., 
United States v. Jackson, 549 F.2d 517,524 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 985,431 U.S. 
923, 431 U.S. 968 (1977): "Severance of Muhammad would not automatically have created 
an environment in which his codefendants could have testified without waiving their Fifth 
Amendment rights. If Muhammad had been severed and tried first, his codefendants 
would have had to waive their Fifth Amendment rights in order to testify on his behalf." 
When appellate courts hold that trial courts have abused discretion in not granting 
severance in this situation, they usually do no more than suggest that it might be appro-
priate to set the cases of the testifying codefendants first. See, e.g., Byrd v. Wainwright, 
428 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Echeles, 352 F.2d 892, 898 (7th Cir. 1965): 
"[W]e do not feel it would have been egregious had the trial judge, after granting the 
motion for separate trial, also directed the Government to proceed first with the case 
against Arrington." Admittedly, order~of-trial problems can become quite complicated 
when more than one defendant wishes to call a codefendant as a defense witness. See 
United States v. Finkelstein, 526 F.2d 517, 523-25 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 
960 (1976). 
275. For example, in United States v. Echeles, 352 F.2d 892 (7th Cir. 1965), an 
attorney, Echeles, and his former client, Arrington, were indicted for suborning perjury 
and perjury respectively. Arrington had stated three times in his earlier criminal proceed-
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instead.276 The court, therefore, must assess the likelihood that 
the codefendant will actually testify when the smoke has cleared. 
Numerous motions for severance have been denied because the 
trial court was not persuaded that the codefendant would in fact 
testify when called upon to do so. 277 
Third, the codefendant may be unwilling, for tactical rea-
sons, to reveal the nature of his testimony. Occasionally, prior 
proceedings may reveal a codefendant's testimony,278 but when 
they do not, trial courts quite properly insist upon more than 
affidavits that merely promise exculpatory or beneficial testi-
mony.279 The codefendant, on the other hand, has no desire to give 
ings that Echeles had not advised him to commit perjury. After holding that severance 
should have been granted and that the trial court could have directed the government to 
try Arrington first, the court addressed the concern that there would still be no guarantee 
that Arrington would testify for Echeles: 
Speculation about what Arrington might do at a later Echeles trial undoubtedly 
would be a matter of some concern to Echeles, but he should not be foreclosed of 
the possibility that Arrington would testify in his behalf merely because that even-
tuality was not a certainty .... Moreover, it would in fact seem more likely than 
not that Arrington would have testified for Echeles for the reason that three times 
previously, in open court, Arrington had voluntarily exculpated Echeles, appar-
ently contrary to his own penal interest. 
352 F.2d at 898. 
276. See generally McCORMICK, supra note 238, § 139. 
277. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 453 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 
405 U.S. 1069 (1972); United States v. Kilgore, 403 F.2d 627 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 
394 U.S. 932 (1969). If the appellate court is persuaded that the testimony sought is 
important to the moving party, it will require severance even if there is no guarantee that 
the testimony will be forthcoming. United States v. Shuford, 454 F.2d 772, 778 (4th Cir. 
1971): 
This is not to say that it is beyond question that Jordan's testiniony would be 
forthcoming after severance. The movant is not put to such stringent proof. A 
reasonable probability appearing that the proffered testimony would, in fact, ma-
terialize, Shuford should not have been foreclosed from the benefits of Jordan's 
pivotal testimony simply because that probability was not an absolute certainty. 
278. See United States v. Starr, 584 F.2d 235 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 
1115 (1979); United States v. Echeles, 352 F.2d 892 (7th Cir. 1965). See also State v. 
Alford, 289 N.C. 372, 222 S.E.2d 222 (codefendant had confessed to the offense and named 
one other than defendant as his partner), vacated and remanded, 429 U.S. 809 (1976). 
279. In United States v. Jackson, 549 F.2d 517 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 985, 
431 U.S. 923, 431 U.S. 968 (1977), four codefendants of defendant Muhammad offered to 
testify for him but only in a severed trial. When asked about the nature of the testimony 
that would be given, each claimed the fifth amendment. Denial of severance was upheld 
on appeal. Although other factors were involved, the appellate court emphasized the 
undisclosed nature of the offered testimony: 
The trial court was, accordingly, asked to take the extreme step of severing Muham-
mad without any knowledge of the nature or extent of purportedly exculpatory 
evidence and without any indications that co-defendants would in fact be willing 
to offer such evidence in the event of severance. The bald and conclusory assertions 
of Muhammad's co-defendants that they possessed potentially exculpatory evi-
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away either his own case or the defendant's. This stalemate may 
be resolved by permitting a codefendant to disclose the testimony 
he would present on behalf of another in chambers, without re-
vealing it to the prosecutor. 280 The proffer could be sealed in the 
record to permit full appellate review of the trial court's ruling on 
the motion for severance. Under such a procedure, trial courts 
could preview the offered testimony before deciding whether to 
' grant severance, without disclosing the testimony prematurely. 
Assuming the trial court has some idea of what the testimony 
will be, a fourth determination remains: how important is the 
testimony to the defendant's case? If the testimony .would provide 
the only defense in the case, the analysis is easy. Usually, how-
ever, the court must make a more difficult judgment. In making 
this judgment, courts have usually asked the wrong questions. 
They ask, for example, whether the testimony exculpates the 
defendant or "merely" impeaches a government witness, 281 
whether the testimony is the only evidence of a fact or "merely" 
corroborates other defense evidence. 282 Courts legitimately want 
not to order severance when the codefendant's testimony is too 
weak to warrant it, but the strength of evidence is not determined 
by whether it is exculpatory rather than impeaching, unique 
rather than corroborative. Consider a very typical case: The de-
fendant's own testimony is not enough to avert a guilty verdict; 
without anything to impeach the government witness, the defen-
dant would lose; but when the codefendant "merely" corrobor-
ates the defendant's alibi283 and "merely" impeaches the govern-
dence did not provide adequate grounds for pre-trial severance in this multi-
defendant trial. 
549 F.2d at 524. 
280. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 14, which provides in part: "In ruling on a motion by 
a defendant for severance the court may order the attorney for the government to deliver 
to the court for inspection in camera any statements or confessions made by the defen-
dants which the government intends to introduce in evidence at the trial." This would 
prevent disclosure to the nondeclarant defendants, who would otherwise have no right to 
discover it. See FED. R. CruM. P. 16. 
281. See, e.g., United States v. Abraham, 541 F.2d 1234 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 
429 U.S. 1102 (1977); Jackson v. United States, 329 A.2d 782, 788 (D.C. App.' 1974). 
282. United States v. Jackson, 549 F.2d 517,525 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 985, 
431 U.S. 923, 431 U.S. 968 (1977); United States v. Thomas, 453 F.2d 141, 144 (9th Cir. 
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1069 (1972). See also United States v. Gay, 567 F.2d 916, 
921 n.7 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. '999 (1978). 
283. See A. AMSTERDAM, B. SEGAL & M. MILLER, supra note 26, at 1-396: 
It is vital to corroborate the defendant on every point on which corroboration is 
possible. Nothing should be left to rest on the defendant's unsupported testimony 
if there is any extrinsic proof of substance to support it .... Every matter in which 
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nient witness's motive by testifying to a prior inconsistent state-
ment, the jury quickly accepts the defendant's arguments. Courts 
must look to what difference particular testimony makes, not to 
whether it is independently conclusive. 
Severance to obtain a codefendant's testimony poses greater 
potential disruption of the trial process than other grounds of 
severance. Sevc0rance on this ground deals with whether the de-
fendant will be able to present defense evidence to the trier of 
fact, and thus affects nonjury as well as jury trials. Further it 
requires an order that the codefendant be tried first. Because 
severance is granted to permit testimony in the second of the 
severed cases, two trials are likely, rather than one trial followed 
by nontrial disposition of the other.284 
Balanced against those considerations, however, is the possi-
bility that a joint trial will preclude an effective defense. If sever-
ance is denied, that decision may contribute to the conviction of 
an innocent person. For that reason alone, this ground of sever-
ance should command the most sympathetic attention of the trial 
courts. 
E. Codefendant's Criminal Record 
Another danger of joinder is that a defendant may be preju-
diced by his codefendant's criminal record. A defendant's record 
of convictions is ordinarily not admissible against him because of 
his right to be tried on the offense charged and not on his criminal 
background.285 There are, however, numerous exceptions to this 
prohibition, and a defendant's record is often admitted for lim-
ited purposes. 286 The jury is instructed about the limited use to 
he is supported by proof that the trier of fact is likely to believe has a capacity to 
spread and envelop his testimony with an atmosphere of veracity. He needs this 
badly, since his testimony is suspect for obvious self-interest. 
284. See text at notes 37-40 supra. 
285. See generally McCORMICK, supra note 238, § 190. 
286. Evidence of a criminal conviction may be admissible because it is an element 
of the offense charged. For example, driving while intoxicated by one who has previously 
been convicted of that offense is frequently made a felony. See, e.g., TEx. STAT. ANN, art. 
67011-2 (Vernon 1977). To prove its charge under such a statute, the prosecution must 
prove the earlier conviction and the current incident. 
A defendant's record may also be used as predisposition evidence when entrapment 
is raised. If the defendant has been convicted of a similar offense, it is less likely that he 
was an innocent person entrapped by the creative activity of a government agent. See 
Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 375 (1958); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 
435, 451 (1932). 
A record may be admitted to determine the credibility of the defendant's testimony. 
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which it is supposed to put the record, but some jurors may con-
sider earlier convictions as evidence of the defendant's criminal 
propensities and convict him accordingly. Joinder exacerbates 
this problem because evidence of a codefendant's record may 
reflect prejudicially on the other defendant. 
On the one hand, the jury may favor a defendant when it 
learns of a codefendant's earlier conviction but not of the defen-
dant's. It might assume (perhaps erroneously) that the defendant 
must not have a record, and acquit him. On the other hand, the 
codefendant's record might unfairly prejudice the defendant. To 
the extent the defenses of the defendant and the codefendant 
interlock, the defendant's case may fall with the codefendant's. 
The jury might also disbelieve a defendant's contention of inno-
cence because of his association with someone with a record, tar-
ring both defendants as "birds of a feather." Finally, if the evi-
dence against each is similar enough to warrant identical treat-
ment of the parties, the jury may convict one defendant only to 
avoid acquitting a codefendant with a record. 
This type of prejudice has aroused the concern of some 
states. A Texas statute, for example, mandates severance if one 
defendant has an admissible conviction and the other does not. 287 
Kentucky courts recognize a presumption of prejudice from join-
der of a defendant with a codefendant who is charged under the 
habitual offender law.288 But most states approach the problem 
on an ad hoc basis and require the defendant to show actual 
prejudice before compelling severance. For example, in Davis v. 
Ordinarily, the conviction must be for a felony or for certain misdemeanors, such as those 
involving "moral turpitude" or "dishonesty or false statement." See FED. R. Evm. 609. A 
defendant's record may also be used to enhance punishment under a habitual offender 
statute. See, e.g., Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967). 
287. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN art. 36.09 (Vernon Supp.1978) provides in part that 
"in cases in which, upon timely motion to sever, and evidence introduced thereon, it is 
made kriown to the court that there is a previous admissible conviction against one 
defendant ... the court shall order a severance .... " This provision has been inter-
preted to require proof that one defendant has a prior conviction admissible in evidence 
while the moving defendant has no prior admissible conviction. See, e.g., Robinson v. 
State, 449 S.W.2d 239, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969). 
288. In Hardin v. Commonwealth, 437 S.W.2d 931, 933 (Ky. Ct. App.1968), the court 
concluded that joinder "for trial with a defendant being tried under the habitual criminal 
statute is inherently prejudicial to a defendant who is not accused under that statute." 
In Jones v. Commonwealth, 457 S.W.2d 627, 629 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970), cert. denied, 401 
U.S. 946 (1971), the court interpreted its earlier statement in Hardin to establish merely 
a presumption of prejudice that could be overcome by evidence, and it indicated that the 
trial court's denial of a motion for severance in the absence of contrary evidence could, 
on appeal, be harmless error. 
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State, 289 the defendant was indicted for auto theft with a codefen-
dant who was alleged in the same indictment to have four prior 
convictions of auto theft. The trial court denied severance. Al-
though the entire indictment, including the allegations of the 
codefendant's convictions, was read to the jury when the trial 
began, 290 the appellate court affirmed the conviction because the 
defendant could specify no particular prejudice from the proce-
dure. As long as an appellate court can conceive of a trial that 
does not prejudice the defendant, it seems unlikely that he will 
prevail in many jurisdictions without direct proof of prejudice. 
Curiously, however, when the codefendant's record is im-
properly revealed to the jury, some courts are quick to find that 
action also prejudicial to the defendant. But to the defendant, an 
improper admission is no more damaging than a proper one. In 
People v. Shuler, 291 for example, the jury incorrectly learned of a 
codefendant's earlier murder conviction. In reversing the defen-
dant's conviction, the court commented: "The evidence against 
both defendants was almost identical, and the only logical verdict 
would have been a conviction of both defendants or an acquittal 
of both of them."292 In a similar case, People v. Watson, 203 the 
court, in reversing the conviction of a defendant because testi-
mony of a previous arrest was improperly admitted against a 
codefendant, commented: 
The two men were being tried together for one criminal act. In the 
minds of the jurors, the two men must have appeared as a single 
unit. . . . When the jury discovered that Harris had an arrest 
record, it is reasonable to conclude that this fact tainted its view 
of Watson. It is a simple matter of "guilt by association."20~ 
In each case the appellate court had earlier reversed the convic-
tion of the codefendant295 and may have believed that justice 
between the defendants required it also to reverse the conviction 
of the defendant. Yet the court surely would not have done so 
unless it felt that the codefendant's record had prejudiced the 
defendant. Courts should recognize that the damage to the defen-
289. 129 Ga. App. 796, 201 S.E.2d 345 (1973). 
290. 129 Ga. App. at 796, 201 S.E.2d at 346 (syllabus by the court). 
291. 55 App. Div. 2d 609, 389 N.Y.S:2d 383 (1976). 
292. 55 App. Div. 2d at 609, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 383. 
293. 55 App. Div. 2d 873, 390 N.Y.S.2d 116 (1977). 
294. 55 App. Div. 2d at 873, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 117. 
295. Shuler's codefendant's conviction was reversed in People v. Gardella, 55 App. 
Div. 2d 607, 389 N.Y.S.2d 118 (1976), and Watson's in People v. Harris, 52 App. Div. 2d 
560, 382 N.Y.S.2d 322 (1976). 
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dant is not less great when the codefendant's record is properly 
admitted, and should sever all defendants when one has a record 
that is admissible at trial. 
F. Lifestyle of Codefendant or Codefendant's Counsel 
Joinder may place a defendant on trial with a codefendant 
whose way of living, manner of dress, or philosophy of existence 
offends some members of the jury. The jury may express its dis-
pleasure with an unfavorable verdict, and may spill some of its 
disfavor onto the defendant. Ordinarily this is not grounds for 
severance, but it is still a factor to be considered when evaluating 
the soundness of joinder as a judicial institution. In United States 
v. De Larosa, 296 three of the four defendants prosecuted jointly 
for bank robbery claimed prejudice to their cases on the ground 
that the fourth defendant wore clothes commonly associated with 
"Black Militants" and used a name also associated with that 
group. The court rejected the claim, commenting, "Severance 
was not required by the unfavorable impression which may have 
been created by [the fourth defendant's] identification with an 
unpopular social and political group."297 In Merrill v. State, 298 the 
defendant, charged with possession of marijuana, moved for sev-
erance on the ground that while he and his attorney were clean 
shaven, both codefendant and his attorney exhibited full, long 
beards and long hair in an unkempt state. The court let this claim 
pass with the comment that it was a "cosmetic handicap."299 
But although severance is not always appropriate in these 
cases, such factors as appearance or lifestyle nevertheless do af-
fect jury deliberations, despite efforts to neutralize them. It is one 
thing for prejudice of this sort to influence the decision of the jury 
296. 450 F.2d 1057 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 927, 405 U.S. 957 (1972). 
297. 450 F.2d at 1065. The fourth defendant's participation introduced other risks of 
prejudice. His alibi witnesses all had criminal records, which were revealed to the jury, 
and one had previously been convicted of perjury. They were also described as "hostile" 
witnesses. Furthermore, some physical evidence was relevant only to the fourth defen-
dant's participation in the offense, but was admitted and was argued by the prosecutor 
to corroborate the accomplice's testimony as to the guilt of all four. 
298. 130 Ga. App. 745, 204 S.E.2d 632 (1974). 
299. 130 Ga. App. at 748, 204 S.E.2d at 636. There was an additional ground for 
severance. The defendant's motion stated that he intended only to introduce his unswom 
statement in defense while his codefendant intended to introduce testimony. Under Geor-
gia law, had the defendant been tried separately, his counsel would have been given the 
right to make the final argument to the jury because no testimony was offered in defense, 
but if the codefendant testified, then both defendants would forfeit this right. The court 
also rejected this contention. 
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as to the person against whom the bias is directed, but it is quite 
another, more serious matter if the prejudice taints one who is 
merely joined for trial with that person. Courts should, therefore, 
guard against this type of prejudice by severing defendants where 
necessary. 
G. Trial Occurrences That Cannot Be Reasonably Anticipated 
Special problems arise when grounds for prejudice unexpect-
edly emerge after a joint trial is underway. Most types of preju-
dice - such as those already discussed - can usually be antici-
pated and raised in a pretrial motion for severance.300 No pretrial 
planning can prepare a defendant for the unexpected actions of 
his codefendants. A codefendant may plead guilty during the 
trial. A codefendant may flee. Or a codefendant may disrupt a 
trial with his behavior. In all these cases, the remaining defen-
dants must face a jury that already has something to hold against 
one defendant; the danger in a joirit trial is that the jury will use 
this prejudice to convict another defendant who had no control 
over his codefendant's actions. A jury may reason, for example, 
that if a codefendant flees during the trial he is guilty. From this 
conclusion, it may reason that defendants joined with the one 
who fled are guilty, too. Similarly, a jury whose patience has been 
severely tried by a disruptive defendant may express its displea-
sure by convicting all the codefendants. Courts try to overcome 
this prejudice with remedial instruction, but often severance is 
the only workable solution. 
United States v. Beasley301 illustrates the p,roblem. Beasley 
was tried jointly with several other defendants for income tax 
evasion. During the trial, all Beasley's codefendants pleaded 
guilty, leaving him to face the jury alone. The trial judge did not 
explain to the jury why some defendants were periodically disap-
pearing from the defense counsel's tables, and Beasley did not 
request any such explanation. On appeal, however, he urged that 
the court's failure to explain was plain error.302 The appellate 
court recognized that the jury might guess that the other defen-
dants had pleaded guilty and therefore assume that Beasley was 
also guilty.303 Nevertheless, it ruled that an explanatory instruc-
300. FED. R. CruM. P. 12(b) provides in part: "The following must be raised prior to 
trial: ... (5) Requests for a severance of ... defendants under Rule 14." 
301. 519 F.2d 233 (5th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 425 U.S. 956 (1976). 
302. See FED. R. CruM. P. 52(b). 
303. The court stated that, "the strong probability of prejudice to Beasley emanating 
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tion304 was not necessary since the remaining defendants had not 
asked for it.305 The court's belief that an explanatory instruction 
would cure the prejudice306 seems unjustified: by settling the 
jury's doubts about the fate of the other defendants, it could 
harm the defendant just as easily as it could help him. The preju-
dice in Beasley would persist with or without an instruction. The 
court's opinion seems particularly strange because the same court 
has reversed convictions of defendants where a codefendant 
pleaded guilty before the trial and the trial court instructed the 
jury of the plea and that it should not be considered as evidence 
from the guilty pleas of all three of his codefendants cast a substantial shadow on the 
fairness of the trial proceedings." 519 F.2d at 238. Further, 
This was a lengthy trial. As the evidence before the jury mounted, defendants began 
to disappear without explanation. It is possible that some jurors may have attrib-
uted their absences to dismissal, severance, mistrial, illness or some condition short 
of confessed guilt. • . . It is . . • equally possible that the jury surmised that pleas 
of guilty caused the disappearance of Matthews, Wilson and Finley. If this is what 
they thought, did it affect their weighing of Beasley's guilt? 
519 F.2d at 239. Finally, the defendants were charged with conspiracy and 
the crime of conspiracy by its very nature may lend itself to an improper jury 
finding of guilt by association with those found to be participants in the conspiracy 
rather than the required finding of guilt based upon proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant participated in the conspiracy. This danger of transferred 
guilt is acute in this case where the evidence against the sole remaining defendant 
repeatedly refers to his relationship with persons who have suddenly and unex-
plainedly disappeared from the trial. 
519 F.2d at 239. 
304. The instruction in question is one "advising the jury that a codefendant has 
pleaded guilty coupled with an instruction that such plea cannot be considered as evi-
dence of the guilt of the remaining defendant." 519 F.2d at 239. 
305. The appellate court speculated that an explanatory instruction may not have 
been requested by Beasley's counsel for tactical reasons, believing that "to emphasize the 
admitted guilt of those others named in the indictment would have been even more 
prejudicial" than to permit the jury to speculate about the fates of the former codefen-
dants. 519 F.2d at 240. 
The appellate court did not consider what the trial court should do when one of the 
remaining defendants requests the instruction while another objects to it. Presumably, the 
trial court must give the instruction. If so, then the tactical decision of the attorney who 
does not wish the instruction, which the court acknowledged was a realistic and legitimate , 
consideration in the context of its plain error discussions, is overridden by the wishes of a 
codefendant who, for whatever reason, views the tactical situation differently. Of course,' 
once the trial court has been required to make the instruction, it must encompass all 
remaining defendants, or else the jury is invited to make a totally irrational judgment that 
the plea is evidence of one codefendant's guilt but not of another's. 
306. The court said that an instruction revealing the pleas of guilty but directing the 
jury to draw from them no inferenc·e as to the remaining defendant's guilt "will prevent 
improper inferences that the codefendants' absence has something to say for the remain-
ing defendant's guilt." 519 F.2d at 239. Of course, this is the same instruction that the 
court had earlier said might do more harm than good. See note 305 supra. 
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of the remaining defendant's guilt. 307 Yet prejudice in that case 
is surely not as strong as when the jury has seen the pleading 
defendants participate in the trial. 
A problem similar to that in Beasley can arise when a co-
defendant flees the jurisdiction during the trial3°8 or in some way 
disrupts the trial.309 Again, the jury may infer a defendant's guilt 
from the actions of a codefendant. The usual judicial response has 
been remedial instruction, 310 but it is not clear that juries are 
really able to follow these instructions. Understandably, courts 
307. See United States v. Vaughn, 546 F.2d 47 (5th Cir. 1977);.United States v. 
Hansen, 544 F.2d 778 (5th Cir. 1977). In Hansen, the court criticized the action of the trial 
court: 
We think this is a bad practice which ought not, and must not, be followed. Trial 
Courts have an abundance of resources tci haridle situations where the plea occurs 
after the jury has been exposed to the array of the multiple defendants and has 
likely heard the reading of an incriminating indictment embellished by the prosecu-
tor's opening statement and perhaps testimony of government witnesses. But there 
is no need to advise the jury or its prospective members that some one not in court, 
not on trial, and not to be tried, has pleaded guilty. The prejudice to the remaining 
parties who are charged with complicity in the acts of the self-confessed guilty 
participant is obvious. 
544 F.2d at 780. 
308. When a defendant flees after trial has begun, the trial may proceed in his 
absence. See Too. R. CruM. P. 43. A judge may instruct the jury that flight is evidence of 
guilt. See McCORMICK, supra note 238, § 271. Some courts have speculated that the ilight 
of one defendant may lead the jury to believe that those who stayed are not guilty. See, 
e.g., United States v. Lobo, 516 F.2d 883 (2d Cir.), cert.' denied, 423 U.S. 837 (1975). But 
assuming such a favorable inference is surely questionable. 
309. A court can take strong measures against a disruptive defendant under Illinois 
v. Allen, 365 U.S. 337 (1970), and these measures might reflect unfavorably on joined 
defendants. A jury might not punish a defendant who has observed rules of courtroom 
behavior, and some courts have noted this as reason to deny a new trial. In Commonwealth 
v. Flowers, __ Mass. App. Ct._, 365 N.E.2d 839, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1077 (1977), 
Flowers and White were tried for robbery. Flowers elected to represent himself and dis-
rupted the trial on several occasions. On appeal, White contended that Flowers's behavior 
had prejudiced him in the eyes of the jury. The court did not agree: 
White argues that Flowers' conduct was such as to engender sympathy for the 
Commonwealth and was thus harmful to him. The record does not support any such 
conclusion. If anything, we are more inclined to the view that if the jury's sympathy 
was directed toward anyone, it would have been toward White and his counsel. 
__ Mass.App. Ct. at __ , 365 N .E.2d at 847. On the other hand, the jury may conclude 
that the passive defendant is as bad as the disrup1ive one because they were being tried 
together. The jury might also be so annoyed by the disruptions that it will not examine 
the evidence with the required detachment. 
310. As to fleeing codefendants, see, e.g., People v. Smith, 63 Mich, App. 35, 233 
N.W.2d 883 (1975); People v. Shepherd, 63 Mich. App. 316, 234 N.W.2d 502 (1976) 
(holding that such an instruction need be given only if requested by the remaining defen-
dant). 
As to disruptive codefendants, see, e.g., United States v. Marshall, 458 F.2d 446 
(2d Cir. 1972); Commonwealth v. Flowers, __ Mass. App. Ct.-, 366 N.E.2d 839, 
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1077 (1977). 
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fear allowing defendants to force a court into granting severance 
where it does not want to, 311 and a disruptive defendant might be 
misbehaving only for that purpose. Nonetheless, whatever advan-
tages a defendant might gain from severance will probably be lost 
because of his behavior,312 and in any case this danger does not 
lessen the prejudice that well-behaved defendants iµight suffer. 
Rather than trying to cure prejudice through instruction, 
courts should be more forthright in their analysis. They should 
acknowledge that a defendant cannot control the actions of his 
codefendants. They should recognize that a jury will often infer 
guilt from the action of one defendant and then apply that infer-
ence to another defendant. As long as defendants are joined, 
nothing can repair the prejudice caused by a codefendant plead-
ing guilty, fleeing the jurisdiction, or disrupting a trial. Trial 
courts should accept that, in these cases, the efforts to preserve 
joinder are often more costly than severance, and they should 
order separate trials whenever they would serve the cause of jus-
tice. 
311. For example, in United States v. Bamberger, 465 F.2d 1119 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 406 U.S. 969 (1972), 413 U.S. 919 (1973), two defendants complained of the 
conduct of two other defendants during their joint trial. In the words of the appellate 
court, 
Young made the following outbursts, inter alia: "white people carry us through this 
mock justice. And the judge sitting up there acting all dignified, with his mess;" 
"we didn't have nothing when you came to pick us up 400 years ago and put us in 
chains. It ain't no different today, you are the same devils, braggarts, braggarts, 
braggarts." In open court, he called F.B.I. agent Keogh a liar, and branded F.B.I. 
agent Childers an "arch-liar." Bamberger continually interrupted the testimony of 
F.B.I. agent Hale, and climaxed this activity by swallowing government exhibit G-
77. 
456 F.2d at 1127. 
The appellate court rejected the contention that the misconduct posed a sufficiently grave 
risk to the rights of the passive defendants to require the trial court to grant a· mistrial 
and severance: 
Courtroom outbursts and disruptions, lately occurring with increased frequency, 
although regrettable and deplorable, cannot be seized upon in and of themselves 
as justifications for retrials. "If such conduct by a co-defendant on trial were held 
to require a retrial it might never be possible to conclude a trial involving more than 
one defendant; it would provide an easy device for defendants to provoke mistrials 
whenever they might choose to do so." 
456 F.2d at 1128 (quoting United States v. Aviles, 274 F.2d 179, 193 (2d Cir. 1960)). 
312. There is a substantial risk of being held in contempt of court, see, e.g., Illinois 
v. Allen, 379 U.S. 337, 344 (1970), and a substantial likelihood that the trial court will 
manage a vivid recollection of the events when it is time for sentencing the disruptive 
defendant, see, e.g., United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41 (1978) (permissible for trial 
judge to increase sentence because of a belief that the defendant committed perjury in 
his own defense). 
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JV. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE 
Legislation and rules of court have moved steadily toward a 
greater reliance on joint trials to dispose of criminal cases in 
which more than one actor is allegedly involved. In 1930, the 
American Law Institute reported in its Code of Criminal Proce-
dure that statutes in twenty-two jurisdictions granted a criminal 
defendant the right to a separate trial in felony cases.313 In 1968, 
the American Bar Asspciation Project on Standards for Criminal 
Justice reported that only eight jurisdictions provided by statute 
or rule for severance in felony cases upon demand of a defen-
dant. 314 Since then, five of those jurisdictions have provided for 
severance in the discretion of the trial court. 315 
Only the Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure, promulgated 
in 1974, run counter to this trend. Rule 472 provides in part: 
[U]pon motion of the prosecuting attorney or defendant . . . the 
court shall sever . . . defendants unless it determines that because 
of a significant risk that material evidence which cannot otherwise 
be preserved will be lost, the severance would defeat the ends of' 
justice.316 
In light of the substantial risk of prejudice inherent in joint trials, 
the position taken in the Uniform Rules is correct. The uncertain 
benefits of joint trials and the mischief they so frequently work 
justify a statute or rule of court giving defendants rights to sepa-
rate trials. While it may be argued that an absolute right to 
severance cuts too deeply, the record of trial and appellate courts 
313. ALI, CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 324, at 239-40 (Proposed Final Draft, 1930). 
The Code of Criminal Procedure itself recommended, "When two or more defendants are 
jointly charged with any offense, whether felony or misdemeanor, they shall be tried 
jointly, unless the court in its discretion on the motion of the prosecuting attorney or any 
defendant orders separate trials." ALI, CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE§ 312 (Official Draft, 
1930). 
314. ABA PROJEcr ON MINIMAL STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING 
TO JolNDER AND SEVERANCE §§ 48-66 (Approved Draft, 1968). 
315. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2101 (1978 Rev.) was amended to make severance discretion-
ary except in capital cases. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 62-1429 (1950) was replaced by KAN, STAT, 
ANN. § 22-3204 (1974), making severance discretionary in all cases. MtNN. STAT, ANN, § 
631.03 (Supp. 1979) was replaced by MINN. R. CRIM. P. 17.03, making severance discre-
tionary but creating a presumption of separate trials. Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-15-47 (1972) 
was interpreted by rule of court and judicial decision to grant a right of severance only in 
capital cases. See Price v. State, 336 So. 2d 1311 (Miss. 1973), NEB. REv. STAT, § 29-2002 
(1957) was amended to provide for discretionary severance. 
One jurisdiction, Vermont, expanded the right of severance. A statute granted a right 
of severance to all persons charged with a felony, other than conspiracy, punishable by 
death or more than five years' imprisonment. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 6507 (1958). Under 
VT. R. CRIM. P. 14, the right to severance was expanded to encompass all felony cases. 
316. UNIFORM RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 472 (Approved Draft, 1974). 
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in administering the discretionary system is so dismal that any-
thing less may be inadequate. 
While legislation providing a right of severance is justified, 
less radical solutions may be more attainable. One possible rem-
edy is to reverse the "presumption" of the current law that defen-
dants jointly charged should be jointly tried. For example, the 
Minnesota rules of court provide in part: · 
When two or more defendants shall be jointly charged with a fe-
lony, they shall be tried separately provided, however, upon writ-
ten motion, the court in the interests of justice and not solely 
related to economy of time or expense may order a joint trial for 
any two or more said defendants.317 
This rule places the burden of justifying a joint trial upon the 
party wishing it, ordinarily the prosecutor. While the phrase "in 
the interest of justice" is too vague to be useful, the trial court is 
also directed not to order a joint trial for reasons "solely related 
to economy of time or expense." These directions require courts 
to consider the justifications that do not relate only to effi-
ciency, 318 reasons which usually would not compel a joint trial. 
317. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 17.03. 
318. See text at notes 43-70 supra. Although the rule, and the statute it superseded 
without change in substance, replaced an earlier statute providing an absolute right to a 
separate trial in felony cases, the Minnesota court adopted the interpretative policy that 
"this state still strongly favors separate trials, and recognizes that they should be the rule 
rather than the exception." State v. Duncan, 250 N.W.2d 189, 198 (Minn. 1977). The 
court, interpreting the requirement that ordering a joint trial must be "in the interest of 
justice and not related to time or economy" emphasized the trauma created by requiring 
certain kinds of victims to testify in multiple trials. In State v. Gengler, 294 Minn. 503, 
200 N.W.2d 187 (1972), three defendants were convicted of having sexual intercourse with 
a child under 14 years of age, and two of those defendants were also convicted of commit-
ting sodomy. The court upheld the joint trial order with the comment: "Clearly, it was in 
the interests of justice that the victims be spared the ordeal of testifying on three separate 
occasions to the terrifying and revolting details of these offenses." 294 Minn. at 504, 200 
N.W.2d at 189. Similarly, in State v. Swenson, 301 Minn. 199, 221 N.W.2d 706 (1974), 
the court upheld a joint trial order in a robbery case on the ground that four of the five 
victims were from 63 to 73 years of age, one of them was nearly blind, and three of them 
had heart problems. In State v. Strimling, 265 N.W.2d 423 (Minn. 1978), however, the 
court upheld a joint trial order on the less standard ground that many of the state's 
witnesses were business associates of the defendants: 
Much of the state's case at trial depended on the testimony of several of the defen-
dants' business associates - witnesses who were at best sympathetic toward defen-
dants and at worst openly hostile toward the prosecution. It would be naive to think 
that the opportunity for such witnesses to rehearse and compare notes following a 
first trial would not affect the state's proof in a second trial. 
265 N.W.2d at 432. The Strimling court also relied on a variant of the "overall view" 
argument for joint trials, see text at note 55 supra, that could authorize joint trials for 
many so-called white-collar crimes: 
[I]n a prosecution for a "white-collar" crime where the defendants have acted in 
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Properly applied, this rule would reserve joinder for the peculiar 
cases in which it is appropriate.319 
Even if courts are reluctant to shift the burden to the prose-
cution, they can at least relax the requirement that a defendant 
show a compelling reason to be severed. Trial courts have uncriti-
cally accepted the alleged benefits of joint trials just as they have 
unthinkingly ignored both the general impediments joint trials 
pose to fair adjudication and the specific prejudices they create 
or aggravate. Trial courts should look realistically at the advan-
tages and disadvantages of joint trials. They could require that a 
defendant show substantial - not monumental - prejudice from 
joinder. The prosecution could then rebut by showing a substan-
tial benefit from joinder. This arrangement of burdens would 
eliminate at least some of the injustices of the current presump-
tion in favor of joinder. 
Appellate courts, too, must scrutinize severance questions 
more closely, respecting appropriate spheres of trial court auton-
omy but appreciating that the legitimacy of an entire lawsuit is 
concert to spin a complex web oflegal and illegal entrepreneurial activity, we think 
justice requires that the members of the jury be confronted with both participants 
in order to facilitate their fullest comprehension of the alleged wrongdoing and the 
accompanying proofs and defenses. We conclude, therefore, that a joint trial was 
not only allowable, but also well-suited to the unusual demands of this prosecution. 
265 N. W .2d at 432. In each of these cases the Minnesota court held that the facts did not 
justify granting a severance to prevent prejudice to the defendants. 
319. Ohio provided by statute: "When two or more persons are jointly indicted for a 
capital offense, each of such persons shall be tried separately, unless the court orders the 
defendants to be tried jointly, upon application by the prosecuting attorney or one or more 
of the defendants and for good cause shown." Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2945.20 (Page 1976), 
superseded without change in substance by Omo R. CruM. P. 14. In State v. Abbott, 152 
Ohio St. 228, 89 N.E.2d 147 (1949), the Ohio Supreme Court placed the burden of showing 
"good cause" under the statute upon the party seeking a joint trial. It interpreted "good 
cause" to be 
some operative factor not present in every case of joint indictments of defendants 
in capital cases. For instance, the additional time and labor required of the state 
or court, or the expense to the state, made necessary by separate trials, cannot be 
assigned or considered as good cause. 
152 Ohio St. at 236, 89 N.E.2d at 151. In State v. Fields, 29 Ohio App. 2d 154,279 N.E.2d 
616 (1971), the court of appeals, in applying the Abbott criteria, held that the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion by providing a joint trial of capital crimes after a change of 
venue had been granted: 
Such change of venue required the transportation of witnesses, exhibits, case mate-
rials and counsel for considerably greater distances than would otherwise have been 
necessary. Duplicatioi'.i of this inconvenience and expense should not be permitted 
unless the examination thereof by a joint trial would result in actual prejudice to 
the defendants jointly tried. 
29 Ohio App. 2d at 160, 279 N.E.2d at 620. 
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in question. With an especially critical eye, they must examine 
the standard justifications for joint trials that the government 
offers to discharge its burden. The prosecution should no longer 
be permitted to rest on its presumption. 
